Fire Power March 20, 2025 Excerpted and adapted from a shiur by Dayan Yitzhak Grossman…
Secondary School, Part II: May One Commit to a Mesivta If He May Yet Choose Another?
Adapted from the writings of Dayan Yitzhak Grossman
February 20, 2025
In our previous article, on the question of whether parents may promise a child’s attendance to a middle-tier mesivta while still seeking a spot at a top-tier one, we challenged an ends-justifying-the-means argument in favor. We noted that reneging on a verbal commitment constitutes an act of bad faith (mechusar amanah), and that one is generally obligated to keep his word. We argued that despite the fact that the Torah does condone lying under certain circumstances, there is no basis whatsoever for extending such dispensations to the breaking of commitments, and certainly not to the making of commitments in bad faith. In this article, we consider a couple of justifications for breaking commitments and their potential application to our question.
Trei tarei (two prices)
Some Rishonim maintain that one who reneges on a commitment is not considered mechusar amanah in the case of “two prices”: If he made a commitment to buy or sell something at a certain price, and the market price of the item changed prior to the actual sale, he is no longer bound by his initial commitment.[1] Many Rishonim disagree and maintain that he is considered mechusar amanah even in such a case.[2]
The Acharonim, too, are divided on this question. Some, including the Rama (R’ Moshe Isserles), the Shelah (R’ Yeshayah Horowitz), and the Minchas Pitim (R’ Meir Arik), rule stringently;[3] the Bach (R’ Yoel Sirkes) considers the matter questionable;[4] and some, including the Chasam Sofer (R’ Moshe Sofer) and the Sheivet Halevi (R’ Shmuel Wosner), rule leniently.[5] The Aruch Hashulchan (R’ Yechiel Michel Epstein) rules that honoring one’s commitment in such a case is not strictly mandatory (midina) but a matter of pious conduct (midas chasidus).[6]
The Melo Haro’im (R’ Yaakov Tzvi Yalish) maintains that even the stringent view only requires that the commitment be honored if the change in price is slight (nishtaneh ketzas), in which case one should not renege just to avoid a small loss (chisaron purta). But in the event of a major change in circumstances, like someone who hired a farmhand and then discovered that his field’s condition made the work unfeasible, all agree that he is not bound by his commitment.[7] The Sheivet Halevi similarly suggests that even the stringent view only requires that one honor his commitment if the price change is small—because such a change is anticipatable, so he should have stipulated that he is not committing if the price changes; if he didn’t, his commitment remains binding.[8]
On the other hand, the Sefer Yehoshua (R’ Yehoshua Heshel Babad) makes the seemingly opposite suggestion: Even the lenient view may not allow reneging on a commitment if the price shift is small (davar muat),[9] which implies that the stringent view does not allow reneging even if the change is large.
In light of the above, if parents committed to send their son to a particular mesivta and later secured a previously unanticipated opportunity at a preferable mesivta, there would be some basis for leniency, though even then the issue is far from clear given all the Rishonim and Acharonim that are stringent regarding trei tarei. But this would presumably not apply to our case, where both parties were well aware of the actuality (from the parents’ perspective) or the likelihood (from the mesivta’s perspective) that the parents applied to other mesivtos, and the mesivta still demanded, as a condition of acceptance, that the parents commit firmly and forgo all other opportunities.
Even according to Rav Wosner’s suggestion that in the case of an unanticipatable change in circumstances, all agree that one is not obligated to honor his commitment, and the dispute among the Rishonim is only about anticipatable change—which implies that the lenient view allows reneging even in the event of an anticipatable change—it still seems clear that this leniency is limited to changes like the price movement discussed by the Rishonim, which, even if somewhat anticipatable, was nevertheless not clearly included in the commitment. In our case, however, the mesivta is clearly demanding that the parent forgo any other opportunities. In other words, it seems quite implausible that anyone would maintain that a change in circumstances justifies reneging when both parties clearly intended the commitment to apply even in the event of exactly that change in circumstances.[10]
Additionally, to the best of this author’s knowledge, the entire discussion of trei tarei is limited to the question of reneging on a good-faith commitment. Nowhere is there any suggestion to permit making a bad-faith commitment, one that the maker does not intend to honor in the case of an anticipated change in circumstances.
A commitment that is not relied on
One possible argument for allowing the parents to renege derives from the fact that mechusar amanah is only applicable where the recipient of the commitment is assumed to have relied on it.
The Gemara says:
But did R’ Yochanan really say this? Didn’t Rabbah bar bar Chanah say in the name of R’ Yochanan: If one says to his fellow, “I will give you a gift,” he is able to renege on this commitment.
What does R’ Yochanan mean when he says he is able to renege? It is obvious! Rather, he must mean he is permitted to renege.
Rav Papa said: R’ Yochanan agrees concerning a small gift (that it is improper to renege), because the recipient relies on him. (In the case of a large gift, the prospective recipient is not sure whether he is serious and will follow through.)[11]
The Gemara makes a similar point elsewhere:
He holds that reneging on a verbal commitment involves acting in bad faith. But that applies only in dealings between one Jew and another, for they uphold their verbal commitments. But when a Jew commits verbally to purchase something from an idolater, since they do not uphold their verbal commitments, he does not have to either (i.e., because the idolater doesn’t expect a verbal commitment to be upheld, it doesn’t carry legal weight).[12]
I have heard it alleged that commitments to mesivtos are frequently broken, and that this is well known. Oy la’aznayim shekach shom’os, and I would like to believe that this is not true. But if it is indeed the case that rather than living up to the standard of “The remnant of Yisrael will not commit corruption, they will not speak falsehood, and a deceitful tongue will not be found in their mouth,”[13] people instead resemble the idolaters of whom it is said, “Their mouth speaks vanity, and their right hand is a right hand of falsehood,”[14] then perhaps kalkalasam takanasam, and such commitments do not engender a mechusar amanah obligation because they are not generally relied upon.
Once again, however, the two cited Gemaros merely indicate that one who reneges on a good-faith commitment that we assume the other party has not relied upon is not considered mechusar amanah, but they certainly do not imply that one may make a bad-faith commitment that he is prepared to violate—even if we assume that the other party will not rely on it.
[1]Ba’al Hama’or Bava Metzia 49a; Piskei HaRosh ibid. perek 4 siman 14; Tur C.M. end of siman 204.
[2]Rashi s.v. Shelo yedaber and Tosfos ibid. s.v. Modeh (as understood by Bais Yosef ibid. and Biur HaGra to C.M. ibid. os 18); Ra’avad, Rashba, and Magid Mishneh (Hilchos Mechirah 7:8 – the Magid Mishneh cites the Ra’avad and Rashba, and the Bais Yosef ibid. cites other Rishonim who cite them as well). Cf. Milchamos Hashem ibid.
[3]Hagahos HaRama ibid. at the very end of the siman; Shnei Luchos Habris, Aseres Hadibros, Chulin, Ner Mitzvah; Pnei Yehoshua to Rashi ibid.; Minchas Pitim, Shiyarei Mincha ibid. at the end of the siman.
[4]Bach ibid. at the very end of the siman.
cites the Bach, possibly indicating that he too considers the matter questionable.
[5]Shu”t Chasam Sofer Y.D. siman 246, and cf. C.M. siman 102 s.v. Vehinei hanogeia le’ikar hadin; Shu”t Sheivet Halevi cheilek 4 siman 206 s.v. Aval mah sheyeish letzadeid lehakel bezeh (the Sheivet Halevi seems to have seen only the teshuvah of the Chasam Sofer in C.M. and not the one in Y.D.).
[6]Aruch Hashulchan ibid. se’if 8.
[7]Melo Haro’im cheilek 1 os shin: sechirus po’alim os 3 p. 212.
[8]Sheivet Halevi ibid. s.v. Aval mah sheyeish letzadeid bezeh im nishtaneh hasha’ar beshiur gadol.
[9]Sefer Yehoshua psakim uchsavim siman 528.
[10]The doctrine of asmachta lo kania does void conditional commitments on the grounds that the maker of the commitment does not truly anticipate that the circumstance upon which his commitment is conditioned will occur, but this doctrine does not seem relevant to our context.
[11]Bava Metzia 49a. Cf. Shu”t Betzeil Hachochmah cheilek 5 siman 158.
[12]Bechoros 13b. Cf. Shu”t Maharsham cheilek 4 siman 95 s.v. Umah shesha’al bedin habechor.
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