Secondary School: May One Commit to One Mesivta If He May Yet Choose Another?

Adapted from the writings of Dayan Yitzhak Grossman

February 13, 2025

R’ Yair Hoffman published this exchange:

Dear Rabbi Hoffman,

The community in which we live[1] has, boruch Hashem, a thriving community of true bnei Torah. There are also a number of mesivtos that serve the community and the situation is a highly competitive one. There are top-tier, middle-tier, and lower-tier mesivtos, and understandably, it is more difficult to get accepted by the top-tier ones. 

In the past, every mesivta shared the same application deadline of Tu BiShvat. However, this year some middle-tier schools changed their process. They now give applicants a “tentative acceptance” but require an immediate response (within 30 minutes) and a commitment to attend.

Here’s the dilemma parents face: Every parent hopes their child will get into a top-tier mesivta. The middle-tier mesivtos are demanding an immediate commitment (and a deposit). If parents decline the middle tier offer but their child isn’t accepted to a top-tier school, the only remaining option would be a lower-tier school. And the top-tier schools haven’t made their decisions yet.

The question is: Is it permissible for parents to falsely promise attendance to a middle-tier mesivta while still hoping to get into a top-tier mesivta?

ANSWER: Fascinating question. 

There is a Yerushalmi in Sanhedrin 3:9 wherein R’ Chiya bar Abba posed a question before R’ Yasa who then asked him, “Are you asking me in a practical case?” He answered, “No.” R’ Ze’ira was dissatisfied that R’ Chiya bar Abba had not asked in a practical case, to know what he would have said.

The implication of this Gemara is that R’ Ze’ira would have wanted R’ Chiya bar Abba to tell a lie to R’ Yasa. The purpose would be to obtain greater knowledge of Torah. This is the conclusion of Rav Palagi in his Sefer Hechafetz Chaim (19:6). There is, however, an important caveat cited by the author of Yalkut Yosef (Volume II Kivud Av Ve’aim p. 237): One may only do so if his intent is 100% lishmah—that he is doing it solely to learn more Torah. If he does it because of the prestige of attending a top-tier mesivta—then it would be forbidden. If possible, it is also recommended to minimize it by giving a noncommittal reply such as “Where else would we send?” We must also keep in mind that sometimes the best svivah for a student is not a high-pressure mesivta but one with rebbeim whose entire focus is to look out for a talmid’s growth.

Generally, however, lying should and must be discouraged—especially so as not to teach our children improper behavior. The best way to do so is by example. Hatzlacha.[2]

Rav Hoffman is a considerable talmid chacham, from whom I have learned much, but I find this ruling deeply troubling and cannot allow it to go unchallenged.

The most fundamental objection to Rav Hoffman’s position is that although the Torah does indeed teach that certain ends can justify mendacious means,[3] these dispensations all involve mere utterances of falsehood, but to the best of my knowledge, nowhere do we find any justification for breaking a commitment made to another or making a commitment to another that one does not intend to honor.

As we have previously discussed, the consensus of halachic authorities is that reneging on a verbal commitment (dvarim) constitutes mechusar amanah (an act of bad faith). Some authorities rule that one who does so violates the precept that “The remnant of Yisrael will not commit corruption, they will not speak falsehood, and a deceitful tongue will not be found in their mouth”; others rule that he may be called a rasha; and others write that he should be informed of the above and publicly denounced if he does not accept this rebuke.[4]

Our previous discussion was in the context of a dispute between R’ Dov Landau and R’ Meir Zvi Bergman about whether the Degel HaTorah political party was bound to honor an agreement it had previously signed with Shas to support the latter’s candidate for mayor of Elad. Rav Bergman declared that

It is clear that if Degel HaTorah, at the behest of the gedolei Torah, signed agreements which they committed to fulfill, the way of the Torah is to fulfill agreements, as required by the Torah. Those who claim that the Torah and Judaism can best be guarded by a certain representative, even when everyone is Chareidi, and therefore agreements shouldn’t be fulfilled, these are words with no basis. On the contrary, fulfilling agreements is the way of Judaism and the only way to prevent disputes and chillul Hashem.

Rav Landau, however, ruled that

The matter of who heads the city…is solely a matter of what is best for Judaism and chinuch and maintaining the Torah and its mitzvos…Therefore, all the agreements signed between the parties have no value and do not obligate anyone.

While Rav Landau’s position may possibly support Rav Hoffman’s ruling in his case, we already noted there that Rav Landau’s position is quite difficult to understand:

The ends do not generally justify the means, so even if one believes that the course of action that “is best for Judaism and chinuch and maintaining the Torah and its mitzvos” in a particular situation necessitates reneging on his agreement, how would that justify engaging in conduct that would normally be considered evil and prohibited? And how does the fact that the issues are of great religious importance make it that “agreements signed between parties have no value and do not obligate anyone?”…(There is considerable discussion in the halachic literature about whether mechusar amanah applies in the event of a change in circumstances after the initial commitment (“trei tarei”), but Rav Landau does not seem to be invoking this dispensation—which is, in any event, disputed.)

Even with respect to the utterance of “mere” falsehood, where, as noted above, certain dispensations do exist, many authorities impose an important limitation on these dispensations. R’ Yehudah Hechasid writes:

Know that even though they have said “It is permitted to depart (from the truth) in matters of peace,”[5] if a non-Jew or a Jew comes and says to a person “Lend me money,” and he does not wish to lend to him because he is afraid he won’t repay him, he cannot say “I do not have,” because that which they said “It is permitted to depart…” is when the matter is in the past.[6]

Although R’ Yehudah Hechasid’s basis and rationale for this distinction are unclear, and some Acharonim indeed reject the distinction as non-normative,[7] a number of important Acharonim do apparently accept it.[8]

Additionally, the question of whether it is permitted to mislead someone for a mitzvah purpose is also quite controversial. The Iyun Yaakov (R’ Yaakov Reischer) suggests that it may be permitted for a talmid chacham to depict his experience studying Torah away from home as more enticing than it actually was, by describing a difficult masechta as easy and his spartan room and board arrangements as comfortable, in order to encourage other students to study Torah and to avoid discouraging them from doing so.[9] (The passage in R’ Chaim Palagi’s Hechafetz Chaim cited by Rav Hoffman is quoting this suggestion of Rav Reischer.)

But on the other hand, in another context, many—albeit not all—poskim staunchly reject the idea of engaging in falsehood and deception even in order to encourage the performance of a mitzvah. The Chida (R’ Chaim Yosef Dovid Azulai) was asked about the permissibility of shill bidding in an auction for the right to perform various mitzvos, where the proceeds go to the communal coffers. He responded that this fundamentally constitutes mirmah vesachbulah (fraud and scheming) and gneivas da’as (obtaining an advantage over another via deception), and it violates “The remnant of Yisrael will not commit corruption…”[10]

Several more recent poskim also prohibit this or similar practices, even when done in the interests of tzedakah: R’ Moshe Sternbuch was asked whether it is permitted “to deceive the public for the sake of tzedakah” by announcing fictitious large donations to inspire the public to make actual large donations. He responds that this constitutes ona’ah (cheating), gneivas da’as, and gezel (theft).[11] R’ Chaim Kanievsky reportedly considered shill bidding to constitute rama’us (fraud),[12] ona’ah, and gneivas da’as,[13] and the Minchas Yitzchak (R’ Yitzchak Yaakov Weiss) also strongly opposes the practice, though he does not articulate the precise nature of the wrong involved. On the other hand, the Brisker Rav (R’ Yitzchak Zev Soloveitchik) reportedly held that shill bidding does not violate any prohibition,[14] and R’ Yisrael Yaakov Fisher sees nothing wrong with the practice and says it is “certainly permitted.”[15]

In any event, all these authorities, from Rav Reischer down to the more recent ones, are discussing the use of falsehood to deceive someone into performing a mitzvah of his own that he might otherwise not perform, so the falsehood can be considered to be in the “victim’s” own best interest, as opposed to Rav Hoffman’s case, where the falsehood is being spoken solely to facilitate the speaker’s mitzvah of studying Torah or having his son do so—possibly even at the expense of the mesivta’s own interests, if the bad-faith commitment causes the mesivta to suffer hassle and wasted time or to miss an opportunity to secure another desirable candidate for its available spot.

We close with the conclusion of a teshuvah of the Rashba concerning the permissibility of engaging in falsehood in a particular case: “Hated is falsehood. Beloved is truth, and (even) vessels of fine gold are no substitute for it.”[16]

In this article, we have solely considered Rav Hoffman’s apparent use of an ends-justifying-the-means argument to permit making a bad-faith commitment to a mesivta; in the following article, we shall, be’ezras Hashem, consider other possible arguments for allowing parents to falsely promise attendance to a middle-tier mesivta while still hoping to get into a top-tier one.

 

I invited R’ Yair Hoffman to respond to Dayan Grossman’s challenge. Here, for the edification of our readers, is his response, followed by a rejoinder from Dayan Grossman.

Rabbi Nosson Kaiser

Editor in chief

 

RAV HOFFMAN RESPONDS:

 

While Rabbi Grossman’s sentiments are certainly laudable, it seems that the overwhelming conclusion of poskim and sources is that it is permitted to lie for the sake of learning more Torah. The Zohar in Parshas Yisro p. 93b permits it. See also Ma’asei Ish Vol. 3 p. 50, where the Chazon Ish himself advised a person to lie about his age to learn in a yeshiva. It is just as likely to damage the yeshiva in that case as in our case, as having a 14-year-old in a yeshiva gedolah would certainly reduce the yeshiva’s prestige. This is cited by the author of Emes Knei on p. 100. This is also the conclusion of the author of Titein Emes LeYaakov, and of Rav Ovadiah Yosef zt”l citing the Yerushalmi at the end of Brachos 9:5. There are certainly poskim upon whom one may rely. As indicated in the response, however, there were certain caveats provided—and that there cannot be an element of seeking the prestige of being in a tier-one institution. Rav Nachum Yavrov zt”l also expressed another caveat, that the concept of mutar leshanos mipnei hashalom is reserved only for those who do not lie. It would seem to this author that the caveat would apply in this case as well. 

As an aside, Rav Elyashiv zt”l told a friend of mine that Rav Yavrov zt”l is the last word in halacha in every sefer that he wrote, and Rav Elyashiv himself would learn Rav Yavrov’s sfarim. Rav Yavrov in his Niv Sfasayim (Hilchos Isurei Sheker 3:3 and in the biurim section p. 47) permits lying for a mitzvah. Certainly, the mitzvah of talmud Torah is far greater than other mitzvos.

 

DAYAN GROSSMAN REPLIES:

 

I thank Rav Hoffman for his response to my critique of his ruling, and I appreciate the erudition that he brings to the discussion. I still, however, find his perspective on this issue troubling.

1) Rav Hoffman still disregards the critical distinction between mere falsehood on the one hand, and the much more serious offense of making a bad-faith commitment, or breaking a commitment, on the other.

2) Rav Hoffman claims that “it seems that the overwhelming conclusion of poskim and sources is that it is permitted to lie for the sake of learning more Torah.” But all he adduces in support of this bold contention, aside from passages from the Zohar and the Iyun Yaakov (the latter of which appears in an aggadic work, although it is indeed cited and seemingly accepted as normative by R’ Chaim Palagi, and is the Iyun Yaakov’s novel interpretation of a Gemara that he himself acknowledges as diverging from those of Rashi, Tosfos, and other Rishonim), is a collection of contemporary halachic works and an anecdote about the Chazon Ish.

Rav Hoffman elides my citations of major Acharonim who prohibit lying, fraud, and cheating even when done for the sake of a mitzvah, as well as the list I cited of major Acharonim who limit the dispensation to lie for the sake of peace—something explicitly permitted and even encouraged by the Gemara, as opposed to lying “for the sake of learning more Torah,” for which there is no clear basis in the Gemara—to a matter that is in the past, and prohibit lying about the present.

Perhaps Rav Hoffman believes that the superlative value of the mitzvah of talmud Torah provides for broader dispensations for lying than that provided by other mitzvos and Torah values. But the opposite argument can be made as well: The poskim state in various contexts that in contrast to other mitzvos, the mitzvah of talmud Torah is less of a justification for ignoring other mitzvah obligations, “because its fundamental purpose is the knowledge of the fulfillment of the other mitzvos,” i.e., invoking the mitzvah of talmud Torah in justification of ignoring another mitzvah is oxymoronic.[17]

3) I have not reviewed all of Rav Hoffman’s sources, but even he only claims one of them as implying that lying “for the sake of learning more Torah” is permitted even when this may cause another harm: the anecdote about the Chazon Ish. This is a very weak basis to permit such a thing.

 

[1]Presumably Lakewood: see the discussions here; here; here; and here, all published about a week prior to Rav Hoffman’s piece.

[2]R’ Yair Hoffman. QUESTION: May Parents Promise to Send to a Mesivta and Then Lie? VINnews. https://vinnews.com/2025/02/02/question-may-parents-promise-to-send-to-a-mesivta-and-then-lie/.

[3]See, e.g., Yevamos 65b; Ksubos 17a; and Bava Metzia 23b.

[4]My Word: When May One Renege on a Commitment? Oct. 19, 2023.

[5]Yevamos 65b.

[6]Sefer Chasidim siman 426.

[7]Torah Lishmah end of siman 364 s.v. Vechasav beSefer Chasidim.

[8]Magein Avraham siman 156 s.k. 2; Elyah Rabbah ibid. os 2 (and cf. Pri Megadim ibid.); Shulchan Aruch Harav ibid. se’if 2 (the Shulchan Aruch Harav proceeds (in parentheses) to argue that R’ Yehudah Hechasid’s ruling is “tzarich iyun ketzas,” but he nevertheless seemingly still accepts it as normative). Shu”t Chasam Sofer cheilek 6 siman 59 end of s.v. Um”sh sheharav amar cites the Magein Avraham in the course of questioning the Gemara’s dispensation to depart from the truth for the sake of peace.

The Maharsham (Orchos Chaim—Kahana) ibid. os 4 and Shu”t Maharsham cheilek 7 siman 152) maintains that R’ Yehudah Hechasid’s distinction is the subject of a dispute among the Rishonim, and he does not decide the matter one way or another (in the general case). R’ Chaim Palagi (Shu”t Leiv Chaim cheilek 1 siman 5 p. 63), too, argues that the distinction is the subject of a dispute among the Rishonim (albeit different ones from those marshaled by the Maharsham).

[9]Iyun Yaakov, Bava Metzia 23.

[10]Shu”t Yosef Ometz siman 57.

[11]Shu”t Teshuvos Vehanhagos cheilek 4 siman 216.

[12]Ner Leshulchan Shabbos, Shabbas Trumah-Zachor, gilyon #733 5781. Cf. R’ Yitzchok Zilberstein, Veha’arev Na, cited here.

[13]Cited by Rav Zilberstein ibid. (the context there is not whether shill bidding is permitted lechat’chilah but whether the mark is obligated to honor his bid after discovering that the bidder opposing him was a shill).

[14]Titein Emes LeYaakov p. 139.

[15]Ibid., haskamah of R’ Yisrael Yaakov Fisher (to an earlier edition) os 5. Cf. Shu”t Dvar Yehoshua cheilek 3 siman 32; R’ Yitzchak Ratzabi, Sha’arei Yitzchak, Hashiur Hashvu’i motza’ei Shabbas Korach, Tamuz 5778 (from p. 13).

[16]Shu”t HaRashba cheilek 3 siman 81.

[17]See Bais Habechirah Mo’ed Katan (Yerushalayim 5736) 9b p. 47a (and cf. Shu”t Maharsham cheilek 1 siman 213 s.v. Um”sh ru”m and the hashmatos there); Mishpat Ha’aveidah siman 265 Moznei Tzedek end of s.k. 2 and Sha’arei Tzedek ibid.