Rough Draft, Part II: Sin Now for Salvation Later?

Adapted from the writings of Dayan Yitzhak Grossman

August 21, 2025

Our previous article cited a ruling attributed by R’ Yitzchak Zilberstein to R’ Yechezkel Abramsky that if it is impossible for someone to obtain an exemption from IDF service, “there is a mitzvah for [him] to leave Eretz Yisrael and make every effort not to live here,” and he should even “desecrate Shabbos and flee the country”:

“If there’s someone among us being forced into the army, and there’s a concern he might stray from the religious path, I command him to desecrate Shabbos.”

That article considered this ruling from the perspective of the principle that “we do not say to a person ‘sin so that another will benefit’”; this one will consider it from the perspective of the halachic debate about condoning the commission of a relatively minor sin in order to forestall a much greater sin.

The Trumas Hadeshen rules that if someone is deserving of excommunication, we do not refrain from excommunicating him out of concern that doing so may cause him to abandon the Torah life (yeitzei letarbus ra’ah).[1] The Rama codifies this ruling.[2] While the Taz strongly disagrees,[3] the Nekudos Hakessef,[4] the Chavos Ya’ir,[5] R’ Yaakov Emden,[6] and the Chasam Sofer[7] all side with the Trumas Hadeshen and the Rama. This is the position of the Radvaz as well, at least in theory, although in practice he urges patience and a nuanced approach that considers the severity of the sin in question and the inveteracy of the sinner. “And everything is according to what the eyes of the judge who is the leader see, provided that all his actions are for the sake of Heaven.”[8]

R’ Yehudah (Mahari) Assad (author of Shu”t Yehudah Ya’aleh) was asked about a kohein who wished to marry a chalutzah (a woman who received chalitzah in lieu of levirate marriage), and there was a concern that if they were prevented from marrying, they would apostatize. Rav Assad’s correspondent considered the possibility of condoning the Rabbinically prohibited marriage in order to prevent them from violating “the entire Torah by apostatizing chas veshalom, and ‘great is a transgression committed for its own sake (ugedolah aveirah lishmah).’”[9] Rav Assad himself, however, vehemently rejects the mere possibility of doing such a thing. He argues that according to the Rama (and Trumas Hadeshen) that we even take active measures to oppose sin—despite the fact that this may provoke the sinner into leaving the Torah—when such measures are mandated by the halacha, a fortiori may we not actively sanction sin. And even the Taz, who maintains that we do not take active measures to oppose sin where doing so may goad the sinner into far greater sin, would still agree that we cannot permit that which halacha prohibits. He makes the further argument that condoning the marriage would violate the principle that one should not sin so that another will benefit (despite the fact that we are merely condoning a prohibited marriage and not actually violating the prohibition ourselves).[10]

R’ Moshe (Maharam) Schick adopts a similar stance in the case of a shul whose members were engaged in bitter dispute about the mechitzah. The more observant members insisted upon a full, robust partition, while the less observant ones declared that if the mechitzah was not a less substantial partition, they would leave the congregation and open their stores on Shabbos (which they had apparently heretofore refrained from doing). Like the Mahari Assad, the Maharam Schick is vehemently opposed to compromising in such a fashion with sinners; he, too, invokes the Rama’s ruling that we do not refrain from excommunicating someone out of concern that this will cause him to abandon Torah, and he invokes the aforementioned principle.’”[11]

The Melamed Leho’il (R’ Dovid Zvi Hoffmann, a disciple of the Maharam Schick) also strongly agrees with the Mahari Assad, whose position he cites in the course of a brief but fascinating teshuvah:

Question: A young man was told by his father to write in the “real school” (a type of secondary school in Germany and elsewhere) on the holy Shabbos, and he does not wish to do so. His mother told him that if he does not heed his father’s voice and there will be a quarrel in the home, she will commit suicide, Rachmana litzlan. Should the young man heed his father to preserve the life of his mother?

Answer: This is not the preservation of life for which we desecrate Shabbos, if his mother deliberately desires to intentionally destroy herself in order to cause her son to leave the religion. for if so, all the inciters (mesisim) will threaten to throw themselves into the sea if their incitement is not heeded. And see the Shu”t Yehudah Ya’aleh…that we may not permit a chalutzah to a kohein despite the concern that they will apostatize (and that is more than the destruction of the body, for it is the destruction of the soul) if we do not concede to them, and a fortiori may we not abrogate the prohibition of Shabbos because of the concern that they will destroy their bodies…[12]

R’ Meir Shapiro is another strong proponent of this strict stance. He was asked about a demand by non-Jewish authorities that Jewish cadavers be supplied for the purpose of dissection for medical education (“Rachmana litzlan”). There was a concern that if the demand was refused, Jews would be denied access to medical school, and some would leave the Torah life in order to be admitted. Like the other authorities cited above, Rav Shapiro rejects the argument for leniency based on this consideration, citing the dispute between the Rama and the Taz regarding excommunication and noting that even the Taz only endorses passively refraining from excommunicating, but there is no basis to permit actually condoning a prohibited act.[13]

There is, however, one seemingly lenient view that does allow violating a relatively minor prohibition in order to forestall a much greater violation: R’ Yehudah (Mahari) Mintz permitted a nursing woman to remarry despite this being forbidden mideRabanan, because it was otherwise “impossible to save two Jewish souls (i.e., mother and child) from leaving the path of religion or everlasting contempt[14] chas veshalom” (i.e., if the mother was not permitted to marry, she would either leave the community or enter into a sinful relationship).[15]

The Taz indeed adduces this position of the Mahari Mintz in support of his opposition to excommunicating a sinner where this will provoke him to abandon the Torah path. But the Chasam Sofer argues that the prohibition for a nursing woman to marry is a special case, because its reason is to promote the welfare of the child (because a nursing woman who conceives again will lose her milk supply, which will endanger the nursing child’s life). And it is certainly not in the interest of the child for his mother to leave religion, because “it is better for him not to nurse than to become lost among the idolaters chas veshalom, and in such a circumstance Chazal never enacted the prohibition in the first place.”[16] In any event, the leniency of the Mahari Mintz itself is highly controversial.[17]

Returning to Rav Abramsky’s ruling: While on the one hand, we have seen that most authorities are opposed to condoning the violation of even a deRabanan to keep someone from leaving Torah observance, they are referring to cases of people who deliberately choose to sin, and the question is whether to sanction a lesser sin in order to forestall a greater one. But in Rav Abramsky’s case, the draftee would rather not sin at all, and he certainly has no current desire to leave Torah, but we are concerned that in the army, he will ultimately yield to temptation and wind up leaving. Perhaps in such a case we may indeed condone even chillul Shabbos. This is certainly a bold and novel idea, however, and at the very least, it does not appear to have a solid basis in the halachic literature.

[1]Trumas Hadeshen, Psakim siman 138.

[2]Hagahah to Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 334:1.

[3]Taz ibid. s.k. 1.

[4]Nekudos Hakessef ibid.

[5]Shu”t Chavos Ya’ir siman 141.

[6]Shu”t Shtei Halechem (Pshemishl 5658) siman 31 pp. 33a-34b.

[7]Shu”t Chasam Sofer Y.D. siman 322.

[8]Shu”t HaRadvaz cheilek 1 siman 187, cited in Birkei Yosef C.M. siman 2 os 2, and see the Birkei Yosef for additional sources on this question.

Cf. Shu”t To’afos Re’eim siman 52; Shu”t Harei Vesamim cheilek 1 siman 38 (and cf. siman 58 and Shu”t Yechaveh Da’as cheilek 3 end of siman 38); Shu”t Igros Moshe Y.D. cheilek 1 siman 53 s.v. Uche’ein ra’ayah yeish; Shu”t Leiv Avraham siman 80; R’ Asher Weiss, Chaninas Posheia Milaseis Es Onsho Mitoch Chemlah Al Acheirim, os 3.