Ground Effect January 15, 2026 Excerpted and adapted from a shiur by Rav Moshe Ze’ev…
Public Address: Doxing in Halacha
Adapted from the writings of Dayan Yitzhak Grossman
September 4, 2025
Law professor and law blogger Eugene Volokh reports that a judge has struck down Daniel’s Law, a West Virginia statute that prohibited the disclosure of the home address or personal phone number of certain government officials “under circumstances in which a reasonable person would believe that providing such information would expose another to harassment or risk of harm to life or property”—a practice known as doxing.[1]
Elsewhere, Volokh writes:
The term “doxing” is not well defined, but is often used broadly to refer to publicly disclosing a person’s name, photograph, address, phone number, employer name, and the like, in connection with some express or implied condemnation of the person. The concern is that such disclosure can instigate or facilitate violence or vandalism targeting the person, or the sending of threats, or the sending of insulting messages, or economic retaliation (often through the person’s employer). Different states have different rules dealing with such matters, and they generally define “doxing” differently, both as to what information is covered, who is protected against such disclosure, what (if any) specific purposes on the discloser’s part must be shown to lead to liability, and more…[2]
The Torah includes a number of prohibitions against various sorts of harmful speech, but they would not seem to encompass doxing. Lashon hara (evil speech) is prohibited, but the Chafetz Chaim repeatedly defines it as speech that disparages another,[3] and publicly disclosing personal information, as unwanted by the victim as it may be, does not constitute disparagement. When done “in connection with some express or implied condemnation of the person,” that condemnation may constitute lashon hara, but the doxing in and of itself would not seem to fall under the prohibition. Similarly, ona’as dvarim (hurtful speech) is prohibited,[4] but once again, doxing itself would not seem to be covered, although the underlying condemnation of the doxed person might well constitute ona’as dvarim.
There are, however, various halachic principles and rules that may indeed be violated by the act of doxing itself. As we have previously noted, while the Torah has no comprehensive framework of privacy rights and regulations, it does include various halachos that are, or at least may be, rooted in a concern for privacy:
The two main classic halachic sources that establish at least some right to privacy are hezek re’iyah (damage by viewing), which some Rishonim understand to embody a concern for the privacy of a person whose affairs would be exposed to his neighbor’s view, and the cheirem (ban) of Rabeinu Gershom (chadra”g) against reading mail addressed to someone else.
Some authorities have advanced additional reasons to forbid the reading of someone else’s correspondence, including the prohibitions of theft, causing harm, and the bearing of tales, and the mitzvah to love one’s neighbor as oneself, but it is not entirely clear whether these are intended as rationales for chadra”g or as independent considerations.
It is unclear whether the two specific prohibitions of hezek re’iyah and chadra”g can serve as a halachic basis for more general privacy rights. With regard to the latter, some poskim limit it to the written word, and do not even extend it to telephone and electronic communications, but others assume that it does extend to those media. Moreover, even those who interpret it narrowly agree that eavesdropping on electronic communications is prohibited for other reasons, including those mentioned in the previous paragraph. Similarly, Rishonim discuss whether hezek re’iyah includes hezek shmiah (damage by hearing), but some Acharonim explain that even if it does not, that is only because traditionally, there was no expectation of privacy regarding verbal conversation; if there is, eavesdropping is forbidden.[5]
As with lashon hara and ona’as dvarim, doxing would not seem to violate chadra”g, nor would it fall under theft or rechilus (talebearing). But it might very well violate the prohibition against causing harm. The Maharchash (R’ Chaim Shabsai) explains that although the harm caused by intercepting, opening, and reading someone’s correspondence may be considered indirect damage (grama benizakin) and thus not sufficient to hold the perpetrator liable after the fact, it is nevertheless prohibited lechat’chilah (ab initio) to even indirectly cause any sort of harm,
and there is no doubt that such an action, to reveal a person’s secrets, will most of the time cause great harm. And even if the harm will not be financial, it will be in another area. It is therefore proper to make a fence and erect an enclosure and punish the perpetrator, as the bais din deems necessary based on the circumstances. And those that remain shall hear and they shall fear…[6],[7]
The Maharchash’s concern would certainly seem to apply to a doxer disclosing someone’s home address or telephone number.
R’ Chaim Palagi suggests that Rabeinu Gershom’s motivation for his ban may have been the imperative of ve’ahavta lereiacha kamocha (you shall love your fellow as yourself)[8]—which teaches that “anything that is hateful to you, do not do unto your fellow.”[9],[10] This would certainly apply to doxing as well. But as noted above, it is not entirely clear whether he means that the mitzvah of ve’ahavta lereiacha kamocha itself might prohibit such conduct, or only that it might have inspired Rabeinu Gershom to institute his ban (and the ban would not seem to apply to doxing, as above). In any event, this writer has long been puzzled by this and similar invocations by other poskim of ve’ahavta lereiacha kamocha as a real basis for ethical and even legal norms (such as the Chafetz Chaim’s declaration that one who speaks lashon hara violates the mitzvas asei of ve’ahavta lereiacha kamocha),[11] because the Torah clearly does sanction many acts that the actor would clearly find hateful if the situation were reversed, e.g., foreclosing on an insolvent debtor’s property, or opening a business that competes with an existing one.
With respect to hezek re’iyah, on the one hand, it is unclear whether the technical rules established by Chazal would apply to doxing—as noted above, it is not even clear whether hezek re’iyah extends to hezek shmiah. On the other hand, poskim and mefarshim have offered a variety of interpretations of the nature of the harm of hezek re’iyah, at least one of which might extend to doxing. Many Acharonim assert that at least one aspect of the harm of hezek re’iyah is hampering the victim’s ability to freely utilize his property (due to embarrassment or to a worry about potential financial injury that may result from the exposure of his confidential affairs),[12] and this, too, would certainly seem to extend to doxing. First, the doxed person may feel unable to freely enjoy his home and property due to the potential for harassment and the risk of harm (e.g., he may feel unable to spend time outdoors or to open his windows). Additionally, if Chazal prohibited infringing upon someone’s privacy by having visual access to his affairs due to the fact that this will result, somewhat indirectly, in his inability to freely enjoy his property, they presumably would also prohibit disclosing his home address and phone number where this will expose him to harassment or violence. (There remain, however, the questions of whether the victim has an expectation of privacy with respect to his unpublished home address and personal number, and whether the lack of such an expectation would render the concern for hezek re’iyah inapplicable.)
Finally, it seems obvious that doxing motivated purely by malice and hatred (as opposed to, e.g., the desire to pressure a public official into changing his position on some matter of interest to the doxer) is wrong, and it may in certain circumstances violate the isurim de’Oreisa of lo sikom (taking revenge) and lo sitor (bearing a grudge).[13]
[1]Eugene Volokh. Court Strikes Down W.Va. “Doxing” Law Banning Publishing Home Addresses and Phone Numbers of Certain Officials. The Volokh Conspiracy–Reason.com.
[2]Eugene Volokh. Free Speech Unmuted: Free Speech and Doxing. The Volokh Conspiracy–Reason.com.
[3]See, e.g., Chafetz Chaim, Psichah, Lavin 1 and Hilchos Lashon Hara klal 1 se’if 1.
[4]See, e.g., ibid. Psichah, Lavin 13, where the Chafetz Chaim asserts that lashon hara will often violate ona’as dvarim.
[5]The Private Sector: Coronavirus, Contagion, and Contact Tracing. Jun. 4, 2020. (See also the follow-up to that article, Going Public: Unauthorized Disclosure in Halacha. Jun. 11, 2020.)
Cf. Hack Attack and Halacha and Corresponding Respect: Privacy in Personal Mail.
[7]Shu”t Toras Chaim (Maharchash) cheilek 3 siman 47.
[10]Shu”t Chikekei Leiv Y.D. siman 49 s.v. Umeiatah.
[11]Chafetz Chaim ibid. Asin 2.
[12]Sma siman 378 s.k. 4. Pis’chei Choshen Hilchos Nezikin Ch. 14 n. 1 asserts that this is the implication of many Acharonim. Cf. Encyclopedia Talmudis Vol. 8 column 661 s.v. Bisodo and n. 26; Kehilos Yaakov Bava Basra siman 5; Even Ha’azel Hilchos Shecheinim 1:2 and 2:16 s.v. Vehinei yeish le’ayein; Kovetz Yesodos Vechakiros–Hezek Re’iyah.
[13]See Chafetz Chaim ibid. Lavin 8-9 for a fascinating and important analysis of the applicability of these prohibitions to lashon hara.
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