Party Line: Can Bais Din Give What the Plaintiff Doesn’t Seek?

Adapted from the writings of Dayan Yitzhak Grossman

June 4, 2026

From the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Margolin v. National Association of Immigration Judges:

Federal courts adhere to the principle of party presentation…That principle—the “rule that points not argued will not be considered”—distinguishes our adversarial system of justice from an inquisitorial one…Because courts are “essentially passive instruments of government,” we rely on the parties to “frame the issues for decision” and decide “only the questions presented.”…

We recently reversed the Fourth Circuit for violating this party-presentation principle. In Clark, a state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate whether the entire jury had been tainted by one juror’s unauthorized crime scene visit…The District Court denied relief, but the Fourth Circuit reversed and granted a new trial. It did so based not on the prisoner’s ineffective-assistance claim, but instead on “a combination of extraordinary failures from juror to judge to attorney” that deprived the prisoner of his confrontation and impartial-jury rights…We summarily reversed. By “granting relief” based on a claim that the prisoner “never asserted and that the State never had the chance to address,” the Fourth Circuit “transgressed the party-presentation principle.”…

So too here. The Fourth Circuit violated the party-presentation principle when it decided “a case different from the one [respondent] advanced.”…

Federal courts are not “roving commissions,” licensed to “‘sally forth each day looking for wrongs to right.’” The Court of Appeals lost sight of those principles here.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Fourth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.[1]

It is unclear whether halacha has an analogue to the party-presentation principle—whether a bais din should consider only the issues raised by the litigants or any that it considers relevant. Halacha does, however, have a much-discussed rule that a bais din may not award a litigant more than he demanded. This article explores this rule, and a follow-up will iy”H discuss the question of a halachic analogue to the party-presentation principle.

The rule that a bais din may not award a litigant more than he demanded was first articulated in a teshuvah of the Rivash, who ruled that such an award should be vacated.[2] He does not cite any precedent or offer a reason, apparently considering it to be self-evident.

A couple of centuries later, the Rama articulates the same rule and derives it from a case in the Gemara:

Ravina surrounded Runia’s field on all four sides. Ravina said to Runia, “Reimburse me for (half) the fence I built.” Runia didn’t give it to him. Ravina said, “Give me based on the cost of a cheap reed fence.” He didn’t give it to him. “Give me the wage of a watchman.” He didn’t give it to him.

The Gemara recounts the full story and concludes:

They came before Rava for judgment. Rava said to Runia: Go appease Ravina with the amount he agreed to be appeased with (i.e., a watchman’s pay). But if not, I will judge you according to Rav Huna’s understanding of R’ Yosi (to pay half the cost of the fence).[3]

The Darchei Moshe apparently understands that Rava actually held like Rav Huna (as Rashi[4] and Tosfos[5] understand Rava). Still, he invoked Rav Huna’s view only as a threat, rather than ordering Runia to pay for half the fence, because a watchman’s pay was Ravina’s final demand, and a bais din is not authorized to award a plaintiff more than he demanded.

The Sma explains that according to this understanding, Rava’s threat to Runia was to impose an extralegal penalty (knas) as a sanction for his intransigence.[6] Alternatively, Rava’s threat may have been in accordance with the din, because if Runia would refuse even to pay the equivalent of a watchman’s wage, we would adjudicate the dispute as if Ravina hadn’t claimed a specific amount and award him whatever halacha entitled him to.[7],[8] The Bach[9] and Shach,[10] on the other hand, explain that Rava was only attempting to pressure Runia so that he would pay, but he would not have carried out the threat had Runia refused.[11]

But beyond the question of how to understand Rava, there is a major dispute among the Acharonim about how broadly to apply the rule of the Rivash and Rama that a bais din may not award a litigant more than he demanded:

According to the Sma[12] and Bach,[13] it applies even if we know that the plaintiff erroneously believes he is not entitled to more than his demand or he is ignorant of the halacha.
According to the Levush,[14] Taz,[15] Shach,[16] and Urim Vetumim,[17] the reason for the rule is that the plaintiff is choosing to waive his right to more money—or perhaps he knows that he is not actually entitled to more for some reason—so if he is clearly unaware, it doesn’t apply. The Urim Vetumim says the rule is likely limited to talmidei chachamim, who know the halacha.
The Me’il Tzedakah goes even further and says the rule only applies if the litigant clearly knows he is entitled to more but chooses to waive it. But if we are uncertain, he is believed to say he was unaware and revise his claim upward. The bais din should inform him that if he originally intended to waive his right to more, any additional money he takes constitutes theft. But if he claims he was unaware, he is believed.[18]

The consensus of the Acharonim on this three-way machlokess is to reject the first view.[19] It is less clear whether the consensus accepts the view of the Shach or that of the Me’il Tzedakah.

The Erech Shai rejects the Me’il Tzedakah’s assumption that a plaintiff that implicitly waived his claim to more by not demanding it is bound by that waiver. He maintains that because the waiver was never explicit, he may retract it and demand more.[20] The Sha’ar Mishpat, too, rejects at least in part the idea he finds implicit in the Shach that if a plaintiff admits that when he initially claimed less he was intending to waive his right to more, he has forfeited that right—because there was no kinyan to solemnize the waiver.[21]

[1]Margolin v. National Association of Immigration Judges. 608 U.S. (2026).

[2]Shu”t HaRivash end of siman 227, cited by Bais Yosef C.M. siman 25 and Darchei Moshe ibid. at the end of os 4 and at the end of siman 17.

[3]Bava Basra 5a.

[4]Ibid. s.v. Peisei.

[5]Ibid. s.v. Ve’i lo.

[6]The Urim Vetumim rejects this idea. In the Tumim ibid. s.k. 8 he characterizes this suggestion as very implausible (“vedochak zeh mevuar lakol ve’ein lo shachar”), and in the Urim ibid. s.k. 28 he rules that a judge has no authority to award a litigant more than he demanded, even as a knas for his opponent’s intransigence.

[7]The Tumim ibid. does not understand the logic behind this.

[8]Sma ibid. s.k. 26.

[9]Bach ibid. end of siman 17.

[10]Shach ibid. s.k. 15.

[11]The Tumim ibid. considers this suggestion a dochak as well; see the continuation of his discussion for two approaches of his own to Rava’s threat that he finds more palatable than the ones he critiques.

[12]Sma ibid.

[13]Bach ibid.

[14]Levush Ir Shushan 17:12.

[15]Taz ibid.

[16]Shach ibid.

[17]Urim Vetumim ibid. Tumim s.k. 8 and Urim s.k. 28.

[18]Shu”t Me’il Tzedakah end of siman 53 p. 71b, cited in Pis’chei Teshuvah ibid. siman 17 s.k. 18. The Moznayim Lamishpat ibid. Mishnah Acharonah se’if 12 and Moznayim Lamishpat s.k. 9 adopts a similar approach.

[19]See the ruling of R’ Yitzchok Nisim, R’ Yosef Shalom Elyashiv, and R’ Betzalel Zolty in Piskei Din Shel Batei Hadin Harabani’im BeYisrael, kerech 2 p. 165.

R’ Yehoshua Ratabi ibid. writes that “Most Acharonim (the Shach, Taz, Tumim, Nesivos, Maharam ibn Chaviv, Chasam Sofer, Aruch Hashulchan, Me’il Tzedakah, Maharsham, and the gaon R’ Yosef Shalom Elyashiv) rule in practice that if the dayan knows with certainty that the plaintiff erred in the halacha, and that is why he did not seek a higher amount, we should rule according to the higher amount to which he is entitled and not the lower amount that he demanded…”

Cf. Ketzos Hachoshen ibid. s.k. 3; Nesivos Hamishpat ibid. Biurim s.k. 1 and Chidushim s.k. 20; Erech Shai ibid. se’if 12; Aruch Hashulchan ibid. 17:19; here; and here.