Mummy Issues: May One Derive Benefit from Human Remains?

Adapted from the writings of Dayan Yitzhak Grossman

October 31, 2024

CNN reports:

An auction house in England has withdrawn human remains, including shrunken heads and ancestral skulls, from sale following an outcry.

The Swan auction house in Tetsworth, Oxfordshire withdrew more than two dozen lots from an upcoming auction titled “The Curious Collector Sale,” including an 18th-century Tsantsa shrunken head, which was expected to fetch £20,000-£25,000 ($26,000-$33,000)…

Other withdrawn lots include an ancestral skull from the Solomon Islands, another from the Fon tribe in Benin, and a double ancestor skull from Congo…

Museum staff removed human remains from its collection of more than 500,000 artifacts, following a three-year review of displays and programming “from an ethical perspective.”

Overall, 120 objects containing human remains were removed from view, along with an additional 71 non-biological objects that were in the same displays, the museum told CNN at the time.[1]

The most widely discussed halachic question raised by museum exhibits of human remains is whether kohanim may enter buildings containing such exhibits; for various detailed treatments of this question, on both the theoretical and practical levels, see the sources cited in the notes.[2] This article and a follow-up consider various other halachic issues raised by exhibits of, and the trade in, human remains, including the prohibition against deriving benefit from human remains;[3] the prohibition against desecrating human remains; the obligation to bury human remains; and the prohibition against doing business in items whose consumption is prohibited. Of course, legal and social norms must be considered as well, due to the principle of dina demalchusa dina (the law of the government is recognized by halacha as binding) and the paramount imperative of avoiding the desecration of Hashem’s Name (chillul Hashem).

A key foundation for our discussion is what may be one of the most macabre group of teshuvos in all of halachic literature: the analyses of several prominent Sphardi authorities of the permissibility of eating mummies for medicinal purposes,[4] and of trading in them. Strange as it sounds to modern ears, eating mummy for health reasons was widely popular in Europe beginning in the twelfth century and persisted for more than 500 years.

The Radvaz (R’ Dovid ibn Zimra) justifies the prevailing customs in his time of eating mummies as medicine and of trading in mummies. His rationales for permitting the former are beyond the scope of this article. But his rationale for the latter is based on the opinion of Tosfos that the prohibition to derive benefit from human remains does not extend to the remains of non-Jews[5] (and the mummies in question are of “non-Jewish decedents, from the time of the ancient Egyptians”).[6] Writing two centuries later, the Mishneh Lamelech (R’ Yehudah Rosanes) also permits benefit from non-Jewish mummies on the same grounds as the Radvaz, and he adds that the prohibition against doing business in items that are forbidden to be eaten also does not apply to mummies, because they are inedible.[7] But the Ginas Vradim (R’ Avraham Halevi, a contemporary of the Mishneh Lamelech) is not convinced that the view of Tosfos is normative, so he forbids benefit even from non-Jewish remains, and he therefore concludes that business in mummies is prohibited.[8]

The Shulchan Aruch rules that the prohibition against deriving benefit from human remains applies to those of both Jews and non-Jews.[9] R’ Ben-Zion Abba Shaul, however, concludes that most authorities, including a number of Rishonim as well as the Gra, allow benefit from non-Jewish remains. Based on this, in combination with other considerations, he permits cornea transplants from non-Jewish decedents.[10]

In light of the above, it would seem that doing business in the remains of Jewish decedents would definitely be prohibited, whereas trading in the remains of non-Jewish ones would be the subject of dispute.

Where deriving benefit from an object is forbidden, may one gaze upon it? The Gemara cites the Mishnah in Midos that states:

Hatches were opened in the upper story of the Kodesh Hakadashim (Holy of Holies) structure, through which they would lower the craftsmen (to make repairs) in crates, so that their eyes should not feast on the beauty of the Kodesh Hakadashim structure.[11]

From the Gemara’s ensuing discussion, however, it emerges that the issue is actually more nuanced than it might appear:

But R’ Shimon ben Pazi said in the name of R’ Yehoshua ben Levi, who said in the name of Bar Kapara: Sound, appearance, and aroma are not subject to the prohibition of me’ilah (deriving benefit from consecrated objects) on the Biblical level! Rather, the requirement to lower the craftsmen in crates is a heightened standard that the Chachamim established for the Kodesh Hakadashim structure.

So on the one hand, although benefit from hekdesh (consecrated property) is prohibited as a form of misuse of such property (me’ilah), sight (mareh) of such property does not constitute me’ilah. But on the other hand, the Chachamim established a heightened standard (ma’alah) of stringency, at least with regard to the Kodesh Hakadashim, and prohibited even gazing upon it. The key question is whether this ma’alah is limited to the Kodesh Hakadashim, or to hekdesh in general, or it extends to all isurei hana’ah (items from which we are forbidden to derive benefit).

R’ Eliyahu Yisrael (author of Kol Eliyahu) maintains that the prohibition of deriving benefit via mareh is limited to hekdesh.[12] The Maharshag (R’ Shimon Greenfeld) inclines to this view as well, in a context quite similar to ours: He was asked whether medical students may examine Jewish cadavers while studying pathology, and he argues that this does not violate the prohibition against benefit from human remains, because “nowhere do we find a prohibition against gazing upon isurei hana’ah” and “perhaps” the Gemara’s prohibition of mareh is limited to hekdesh.[13] (He proceeds, however, to raise another issue with examining cadavers: the prohibition against desecrating human remains. We will iy”H consider his treatment of this issue, and its application to our question, in a follow-up to this article.)

Other authorities, however, including R’ Ovadia Yosef,[14] extend the prohibition of deriving benefit via mareh to all isurei hana’ah.[15] The Shulchan Aruch codifies a ruling of Rabeinu Yerucham prohibiting gazing at idolatrous beauty “because he derives benefit from the gazing,” based on the conclusion of the above Gemara that although mareh does not constitute me’ilah, it is nevertheless prohibited.[16] Rabeinu Yerucham and the Shulchan Aruch clearly understand that the prohibition of mareh is not limited to gazing upon the Kodesh Hakadashim, but it is possible that their extension of the prohibition is limited to avodah zarah, which has numerous unique stringencies.[17]

Therefore, if viewing human remains at a museum can be considered to constitute deriving benefit, then if the remains in question are included in the prohibition, the permissibility of viewing them would hinge on the dispute whether benefit via mareh is forbidden in all isurei hana’ah or only hekdesh and avodah zarah.

[1]Jack Guy. Auction house withdraws shrunken heads and other human remains from sale following outcry. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2024/10/09/style/auction-house-shrunken-heads-intl-scli-gbr/index.html.

Cf. here.

[2]See, e.g. Halachipedia: Visiting Art Museums – Kohanim visiting Museums; R’ Yirmiyohu Kaganoff, Finding a Compatible Place for Our Family’s Outings (alternate version, brief discussion of the issue here and here); https://www.star-k.org/articles/articles/insights-from-institute/599/insights-from-the-institute-summer-2011/.

[3]See Encyclopedia Talmudis, Meis: Issur hana’ah.

[4]See, e.g., Mariel Carr. Mummies and the Usefulness of Death. Distillations Magazine. Oct. 13, 2014; Dawson WR. Mummy as a Drug. Proc R Soc Med. 1927 Nov; 21(1):34-9. PMID: 19986148; PMCID: PMC2101801; Maria Cohut. ‘Mumia’: The strange history of human remains…as medicine. MedicalNewsToday. Sep. 14, 2020.

[5]Tosfos Bava Kama 10a s.v. Shehashor.

[6]Shu”t Radvaz cheilek 3 siman 979 (548).

[7]Mishneh Lamelech Hilchos Avel 14:21. Cf. R’ Yehuda Dovid Bleich, Contemporary Halakhic Problems, Vol. IV Ch. VIII: Fetal Tissue Research.

[8]Shu”t Ginas Vradim Y.D. klal 1 siman 4.

[9]Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 349:1.

[10]Shu”t Yabia Omer cheilek 3 Y.D. siman 20 osios 10-11. For further halachic discussion of the general topic of cornea transplants, see the rest of Rav Abba Shaul’s teshuvah; R’ Ovadia Yosef’s response to Rav Abba Shaul in Yabia Omer ibid. simanim 21-23; Sheivet Mihudah (Unterman) from p. 313 (and the earlier discussions referenced there); Shu”t Yaskil Avdi cheilek 6 Y.D. siman 26; R’ Chaim Jachter: Organ Transplants – Part 1: Kidney and Cornea.

[11]Psachim 26a.

[12]Shu”t Kol Eliyahu cheilek 2 O.C. siman 23 s.v. Achein yeira’eh li.

[13]Shu”t Maharshag cheilek 2 siman 210.

[14]Shu”t Yabia Omer cheilek 10 O.C. siman 34. Cf. Chafetz Chaim Hilchos Lashon Hara klal 6 Be’er Mayim Chaim os 14.

[15]See R’ Ehud Achituv, Hana’ah Meire’iyas Peiros Orlah; R’ Yehudah Halevi Amichai, Shimush Bepeiros Orlah Lekishut, os 4; R’ Meir Pinchasi, Tzfiah beShabbos Al Kadur Poreiach, Rachafanim, Ve’ofnoei Yam; R’ Avraham Avidan, Kol Mareh Vereiach Ein Bahen Mishum Me’ilah, Sha’alei Da’as 7 os 6 p. 82; Shu”t Bemar’ei Habazak cheilek 7, Hayachas Le’avodah Zarah Beyameinu Veyachas HaYahadus Le’amanus, n. 17.

[16]Toldos Adam VeChavah nesiv 17 cheilek 5 p. 159 (cited in Bais Yosef Y.D. end of siman 142); Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 142:15. Cf. Shu”t Divrei Malkiel cheilek 5 siman 90. The Maharshag ibid. seems to suggest that there is no prohibition of mareh even in the context of idolatry, but this would seem to contradict the position of Rabeinu Yerucham and the Shulchan Aruch.

[17]Chidushei Chasam Sofer Chulin 89a s.v. Ella detzarich iyun indeed maintains that the prohibition of kol, mareh, vereiach is mideRabanan in the context of hekdesh but mide’Oreisa in the context of avodah zarah. R’ Ovadia Yosef’s not acknowledging the possibility of such a distinction in his teshuvah is puzzling.