Mean Deviation: When You Don’t Mean What They Mean

Adapted from the writings of Dayan Yitzhak Grossman

April 10, 2025

Recently, Agudath Israel of America released a kol korei from the Moetzes Gedolei HaTorah of America that prohibits voting in the ongoing election of American delegates to the World Zionist Congress, the supreme organ of the World Zionist Organization (WZO), on various grounds. From the kol korei:

In order to vote, the voter must sign a declaration that he accepts upon himself the Zionist ideology, which does not recognize that the Jewish people is bound by the Torah. He also declares that he encourages participation in the IDF and that those who are exempt must serve in Sheirut Le’umi (national service for both yeshiva students and Chareidi girls)…We therefore believe that it is forbidden to vote in these elections.

We do not intend to impugn the honor of those distinguished rabbis who ruled that it is permitted.[1] However, our opinion is that there are many isurim (prohibitions) involved here…There is a massive chillul Hashem in declaring acceptance of the heretical ideas of the WZO…It is obvious that the money hoped to be received from the WZO does not justify these serious isurim.[2]

R’ Yair Hoffman has been a prominent and prolific advocate for voting in the election[3] (at least prior to the release of the kol korei[4]); he has countered the objection to the declaration requirement as follows:

As far as the question of the particular language that one must accept in order to vote: Nowhere is it written that one must one accept the intent that an author had in mind when something was written. When the State of Israel’s very Declaration of Independence was signed by Agudas Yisroel’s representative, Rav Yitzchok Meir Levine zt”l, brother-in-law of the Gerrer Rebbe, this issue came up regarding the term “Tzur Yisroel (Rock of Israel).” Tzion is a term used by the great prophets of Klal Yisroel; Yeshayahu is just one example in his words, “Lema’an Tzion lo echesheh”…

And as for the second animadversion, that a voter must support national service for those not in the army—there are many types of national service, including chesed and reciting brachos (See Rashi, Brachos 34a). There is no special mitzvah to adhere to the intent of those who wrote the document.[5]

Let’s imagine that we stand at the very formation of Klal Yisroel. It is time for the brachos. If things go as planned, Eisav would get the brachos. There is da’as Torah going both ways. Yitzchok Avinu says, let’s give it to Eisav. Rivka Imeinu says, “No, Yaakov, take the funding away from Eisav and take it for yourself—for the future of Torah. Ki heim chayeinu! Say the words ‘Anochi. Eisav bechorecha.’”

But what would have happened if there had been a huge outcry against Yaakov? “How dare you say, ‘Anochi Eisav’?! Eisav is a rasha! He is a kofer! He is a rotzayach! He was me’aneis a na’arah hame’orasah! And you sign onto saying Anochi Eisav?”

Ultimately, Yaakov Avinu did say, “Anochi. Eisav bechorecha.” And the Torah world developed along the path that it should have. Boruch Hashem.

This is essentially what is happening now. There is a conflict of da’as Torah. One side is saying, “But if you vote, you are joining up with avodah zarah! It is kefirah!” The other side is saying that the word Zionist is an anglicized version of Tzion, which appears in Tanach over 150 times. In Sefer Yeshayahu alone, Tzion is mentioned 47 times! Lema’an Tzion lo echesheh—for the sake of Tzion, I shall not be silent (Yeshahayu 62:1)!  Why can’t we sign a form and have in mind the true Torah definition of the word? How are we allowing kofrim to hijack a word and redefine it?

Registering to vote for the frum slate in the WZO election with this in mind is less of a stretch than Yaakov Avinu’s “Anochi. Eisav bechorecha.”[6]

(Emphases in the original.)

This matter is the subject of a statement of Chazal about Aharon’s proclaiming, following the fashioning of the Eigel Hazahav, “a festival for Hashem tomorrow!”[7] Rashi cites Vayikra Rabbah, which explains that Aharon did not actually intend to proclaim a feast for the Calf. Rather, “in his heart he had in mind Heaven; he was sure that Moshe would arrive and they would serve the Omnipresent.”[8]

The Ibn Ezra explains differently:

The thoughts of one’s heart are of no avail, for one who curses Hashem is killed for what he said (and cannot claim that he did not actually intend to curse Hashem). The case is the same with a person who says “Let us go and serve other gods” (Dvarim 13:7). One who explains “I am Eisav your firstborn” (Bereishis 27:19) to mean “I am what I am, but Eisav is your firstborn,” this is not the plain meaning of the text, nor does it accord with the rules of rhetoric. If a person asks his neighbor in a court of law, “Are you the one to whom I lent [a sum of money]?” and his neighbor responds, “I am,” he cannot later say, “What I meant was, I am his neighbor”…[9]

We shall not enter here into the question of the theological acceptability of the required declaration in our case,[10] but assuming that the plain meaning of the declaration is indeed heretical, as asserted in the kol korei, there are potentially two distinct problems with making such a declaration:

1. Regardless of whether one actually believes the declaration’s theology, by accepting the declaration he is making an apparent affirmation of heresy.
2. If one does not actually believe the declaration’s theology but he accepts the declaration anyway, he may be guilty of sheker, geneivas da’as, and geneivas mamon (mendacity, deception, and fraud).

In this article, we consider the first issue, and in a follow-up we will iy”H consider the second.

The Gemara says:

And Rava said: A tzurba meiRabanan (talmid chacham) is permitted to say, “Avda denura ana (I am a servant of fire), so I will not give money for the head tax.” What is the reason? Because it is obvious that he speaks this way only to chase away a lion from himself (i.e., to avoid paying the tax, and it is therefore permitted even though one is normally forbidden to say he is an idolater).[11]

The Rishonim generally agree that one who says “avda denura ana” appears to be associating himself with an idolatrous fire cult, but they disagree about the precise meaning of the phrase: While some understand that the speaker is identifying himself as a fire worshipper or priest,[12] many say he is only claiming to be a servant of such a person.[13]

In any event, the Ran explains the Gemara as follows:

It is not like professing fealty to idolatry, for it is clearly evident that he is saying this only to exempt himself from the head tax. When it says “tzurba meiRabanan” it is stating a revusa (novelty), that even a Torah scholar is permitted to say this, for although they think he is referring to idolatry, in his heart he is referring to Heaven, as it is written, “For Hashem, your G-d—He is a consuming fire, a zealous G-d.”[14]^,[15]

While the Ran understands that the dispensation is not limited to talmidei chachamim, a number of other Rishonim and Acharonim maintain that it is, for a variety of different reasons.[16] Based on this Gemara, the Nimukei Yosef rules:

Where they have decreed that anyone who is called a Jew shall be killed because he is not an idolater, and one changes his dress to their dress in order that they not recognize him, in order to save his life, this is permitted…and I have an additional proof of this (from the above Gemara)…and a fortiori here, where he does not say anything…[17]

The Rosh, however, rules that it prohibited to identify oneself as an idolater even to avoid death.[18] The Bais Yosef and the Rama understand that these rulings of the Rosh and the Nimukei Yosef are consistent and complementary: It is prohibited to unambiguously profess heresy or idolatry, even to save one’s life. But one may disguise himself as an idolater, or make an ambiguous statement that will be understood by his interlocutor as a profession of idolatry but is not intended as such by the speaker.[19]

The Shach understands the position of the Rama to be that for one who is not a talmid chacham, even an ambiguous statement is only permitted when his life is at stake. When faced with mere financial loss, even such a statement is prohibited, except for a talmid chacham (but see the notes for an important caveat to this dispensation).[20] He notes that this is the position of the Maharshal as well.[21] It is also the conclusion of the Knessess Hagedolah.[22]

[1]See here (R’ Kalman Epstein) and here (R’ Avrohom Gurwicz).

[2]Kol Korei Regarding the Elections for the WZO. Agudath Israel of America. This kol korei was widely reported in American Jewish online media outlets: Yeshiva World News; VINnews; Matzav.com; 5 Towns Central; The Jewish Voice; Hefkervelt.

[3]See here, here, here, and here (as well as here, written at the time of the previous election five years ago).

[4]Rav Hoffman reported on the kol korei here.

[5]R’ Yair Hoffman. A Regretful Op-Ed. VINnews.

[6]R’ Yair Hoffman. Anochi. Aisav Bechorcha. VINnews.

[7]Shmos 32:5.

[8]Rashi ibid., citing Vayikra Rabbah parshah 10 piska 3.

[9]Ibn Ezra ibid. (peirush ha’aruch). We shall iy”H consider the Ibn Ezra’s rejection of the reinterpretation of Yaakov’s statement, and his assertion regarding civil procedure, in the following article.

[10]The election rules require that a registrant accepts the “Jerusalem Program,” which is “the official platform of the World Zionist Organization and the Zionist movement”; the text is available here.

[11]Nedarim 62b.

[12]Tosfos as cited in Nimukei Yosef (Bava Kama 40b in Rif pagination) in the name of ”mefarshim.”

[13]Our Tosfos and the Rosh (s.v. Letzurba meiRabanan) to Nedarim ibid.; “other mefarshim” cited in Nimukei Yosef ibid.

Cf. Shu”t HaRashba cheilek 1 siman 84 and Shiyarei Knessess Hagedolah ibid. Hagahos Tur os 18 at length. (An abridged version of his discussion is printed in the standard edition of the Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 157:2.) The Knessess Hagedolah only cites the Rosh s.v. Avda denura ana, and he appears to have overlooked the Rosh’s comments in s.v. Letzurba meiRabanan.

[14]Dvarim 4:24.

[15]Ran ibid.

[16]The Rosh (in his peirush on the Gemara) explains that we are not concerned that a talmid chacham who is granted such a dispensation will engage in further, unwarranted laxity; the Shach (Y.D. ibid. end of s.k. 18) notes that this implies that the dispensation is limited to a talmid chacham. The Nimukei Yosef (ibid.) explains that “they permitted this because the talmid chacham knows to mean in his heart Hakadosh Baruch Hu, who is ‘a consuming fire’”; this, too, seems to imply that the dispensation is limited to a talmid chacham. The Maharsha (Chidushei Agados to Nedarim ibid.) explicitly rejects the Ran’s interpretation and explains that only a talmid chacham, as opposed to an ignoramus, is considered a servant of Hashem, who is called “a consuming fire.” The Maharshal (Yam Shel Shlomo Bava Kama perek 10 end of siman 19), too, rejects the approach of the Ran and rules that the dispensation is limited to a talmid chacham, either because we are concerned that one who is not a talmid chacham will engage in unwarranted laxity or because a talmid chacham is actually exempt from the head tax (as Rava himself asserts immediately prior to his statement), so he is merely defending himself against theft. (This latter approach of the Maharshal already appears in Shu”t HaRashba ibid.).

Cf. Bais Lechem Yehudah to Shulchan Aruch ibid.

[17]Nimukei Yosef ibid. Cf. Yam Shel Shlomo ibid. and Shach ibid.; Trumas Hadeshen cheilek 1 siman 197 (196 (2) in some editions).

[18]Piskei HaRosh Avodah Zarah perek 2 siman 4.

[19]Bais Yosef ibid. s.v. Asur le’adam lomar shehu aku”m kedei shelo yaharguhu; Shulchan Aruch and Hagahos HaRama ibid. se’if 2.

[20]Shach ibid.

[21]Yam Shel Shlomo ibid. It would seem that according to the first approach of the Maharshal cited above, a talmid chacham would be permitted to make such a statement in any case of financial loss, whereas according to his second approach, he would only be permitted to do so when faced with the theft of his property.

[22]Cf. Shu”t Mima’amakim cheilek 1 siman 15 pp. 102-03; Chashukei Chemed Avodah Zarah daf 13a pp. 99-102; R’ Ohad Fixler, His’chazus Legoy.