City Limits August 13, 2026 Excerpted and adapted from a shiur by Rav Moshe Ze’ev…
Mean Deviation, Part II: When You Don’t Mean What They Mean
Adapted from the writings of Dayan Yitzhak Grossman
April 24, 2025
In our previous article, we discussed the permissibility of making a statement that is intended to appear to others to be a profession of idolatry or heresy, in order to avoid death or financial loss, where the speaker has a different meaning in mind. In this article, we discuss the more general question of whether one may use deliberately misleading language, with the intent of implying something false to others, but have in mind a truthful meaning.
In the previous article, we cited R’ Yair Hoffman as asserting that
As far as the question of the particular language that one must accept in order to vote: Nowhere is it written that one must one accept the intent that an author had in mind when something was written. When the State of Israel’s very Declaration of Independence was signed by Agudas Yisroel’s representative, Rav Yitzchok Meir Levine zt”l, brother-in-law of the Gerrer Rebbe, this issue came up regarding the term “Tzur Yisroel (Rock of Israel).” Tzion is a term used by the great nevi’im of Klal Yisroel; Yeshayahu is just one example in his words, “Lema’an Tzion lo echesheh”…
And as for the second animadversion, that a voter must support national service for those not in the army—there are many types of national service, including chesed and reciting brachos (See Rashi, Brachos 34a). There is no special mitzvah to adhere to the intent of those who wrote the document.[1]
Let’s imagine that we stand at the very formation of Klal Yisroel. It is time for the brachos. If things go as planned, Eisav would get the brachos. There is da’as Torah going both ways. Yitzchok Avinu says, let’s give it to Eisav. Rivka Imeinu says, “No, Yaakov, take the funding away from Eisav and take it for yourself—for the future of Torah. Ki heim chayeinu! Say the words ‘Anochi. Eisav bechorecha.’”
Rav Hoffman’s justification of Yaakov uttering the words “Anochi Eisav bechorecha (It is I, Eisav your firstborn)”[2] first appears in a version of the Tanchuma:
Even though you say he lied, Yaakov did not lie. Bil’am said: “He perceived no iniquity in Yaakov.”[3] Rather, Yaakov said: “It is I, Yaakov. Eisav is your firstborn.”[4]
Rashi explains similarly: “I am the one who brings [the food] to you, and Eisav is your firstborn.” He explains Yaakov’s subsequent statement that “I have done as you told me” to mean “I have done many things as you told me,” i.e., on other occasions.[5]
The Bechor Shor also interprets Yaakov’s statements this way:
He did not lie to his father. When he asked him “Who are you?”[6] he said to him “It is I,” for that is the common reply. He additionally said to him “Eisav is your firstborn,” which was true as well, and “I have done as you told me” many times.[7]
Other mefarshim offer a somewhat different justification of the truthfulness of Yaakov’s statement. Rabeinu Bachya explains:
There is no doubt that in all the words of Yaakov there is nothing but truth, and so testifies the navi about him: “Grant truth to Yaakov.”[8]…When he said “It is I, Eisav your firstborn,” he meant “I am in the place of Eisav and your firstborn,” i.e., in Eisav’s place with respect to the birthright. It was due to the birthright that Yitzchak desired to bless Eisav, and the brachos were therefore due to Yaakov in his stead. For he had previously purchased the birthright from Eisav, and he succeeded to the birthright via Eisav’s authority. And one who succeeds to something via his fellow’s authority is considered like him and stands in his place…[9]
Ibn Ezra, however, dismisses this perspective on Yaakov’s words as “divrei ruach (nonsense)”:
Some say, far be it that a navi should lie. We must therefore interpret Yaakov’s words to his father as follows: “I am who I am, and Eisav is your firstborn.” Others say that Yaakov quietly said “I am” and then loudly said “Eisav is your firstborn.” Now, these interpretations are nonsense…[10]
Ibn Ezra proceeds to explain that in certain circumstances, nevi’im are indeed permitted to lie, and he cites a number of examples of great nevi’im uttering outright lies, and there is thus no need to justify Yaakov’s response to his father as somehow truthful.[11]
As we noted in the previous article, Ibn Ezra reiterates his rejection of this approach to Yaakov’s words in the context of a discussion of Aharon’s role in the fashioning of the Golden Calf:
The thoughts of one’s heart are of no avail, for one who curses Hashem is killed for what he said (and cannot claim that he did not actually intend to curse Hashem). The case is the same with a person who says “Let us go and serve other gods” (Dvarim 13:7). One who explains “I am Eisav your firstborn” (Bereishis 27:19) to mean “I am what I am, but Eisav is your firstborn,” this is not the plain meaning of the text, nor does it accord with the rules of rhetoric. If a person asks his neighbor in a court of law, “Are you the one to whom I lent [a sum of money]?” and his neighbor responds “I am,” he cannot later say, “What I meant was, I am his neighbor”…[12]
Ibn Ezra’s fundamental assumptions—that the thoughts of one’s heart are of no avail and that one cannot plead in court that he did not intend the plain meaning of what he said—are actually the subject of considerable discussion in the Gemara.
The Mishnah states:
What is a vain oath? It is…when one swears about something that is impossible. For example: “I swear that all the fruit of the world should be forbidden to me if I did not see a camel flying in the air” or “if I did not see a snake like the beam of an olive press.”[13]
The Gemara challenges this:
Ravina said to Rav Ashi: But perhaps this man saw a large bird and named it “Camel,” and then, when he swore that he saw a flying camel, he swore based on his own understanding of his words.
The Gemara then proceeds with a lengthy debate about whether we follow the speaker’s “mouth”—the straightforward meaning of his words—or his “understanding”—the meaning he intended:
And if you will say that we follow only the plain meaning of his words, and we do not follow his own understanding of them, that is incorrect! For it was taught in a breisa, concerning the procedure for administering an oath in bais din: When the dayanim have a litigant swear, they tell him: “You should know that we are having you swear not based on your own understanding of the oath. Rather, you swear based on our understanding and based on the understanding of the bais din. What is the reason that the dayanim must make this declaration? Is it not because we say that perhaps he gave wooden chips to his opponent and called them “coins,” so that when he swears that he gave coins to his opponent, he will swear based on his own understanding of his words, and he will be swearing truthfully? (Thus, is it not clear that in the absence of such a declaration, an oath can be considered truthful based on the swearer’s own understanding of his words?)
No! We follow only the plain meaning of the words. Nevertheless there, in the breisa, the dayanim must make the declaration because of the possibility that the litigant will deceive them even with the plain meaning of the words, as in the case of the cane that occurred in the court of Rava.[14]
The Gemara’s debate continues further but reaches no explicit conclusion. Since the only defense the Gemara offers for the ruling of the Mishnah against Ravina’s challenge is that we follow his “mouth” and not his “understanding,” that would seem to be the normative halacha. This is indeed the view of the Rosh,[15] but the Rambam apparently maintains that absent an explicit statement that one’s oath is based on another’s understanding, the swearer can indeed claim that he swore based on his own understanding:
One who swears and says: “I swear that I will not eat today, and I swear based on your understanding,” he may not (later) say: “Such-and-such was in my heart.” For he did not swear based on his own understanding, but based on the understanding of others…
Therefore, when dayanim administer an oath to a person, they tell him: “We are not swearing you based on your understanding, but based on our understanding.[16]
[1]R’ Yair Hoffman. A Regretful Op-Ed. VINnews.
[4]Tanchuma (Buber) Toldos 10.
[6]Bereishis ibid. v. 18.
[9]Rabeinu Bachya Bereishis ibid. He proceeds to explain how the rest of Yaakov’s statements to his father were truthful as well.
Other mefarshim who take this basic approach include Riva ibid., Chizkuni ibid., and Kli Yakar ibid. v. 36.
[11]A similar approach to Yaakov’s conduct is taken by Radak ibid. and “some commentators” cited by Chizkuni ibid.
Cf. Ein Yosef (Chazzan) Parshas Toldos ibid. p. 53a (cited in Hechafeitz Chaim siman 19 os 9) and Shu”t Chikrei Halacha (Mazuz) siman 52.
[12]Ibn Ezra Shmos 32:1 (peirush ha’aroch).
Cf. Torah Shleimah ibid. (cheilek 4) #76 pp. 1082-83.
[14]Shvuos 29a-29b. A closely parallel discussion is found in Nedarim 24b-25a.
[15]Piskei HaRosh Shvuos perek 3 simanim 20-21, and cf. Pilpula Charifta ibid. perek 6 siman 3 os 7.
[16]Hilchos Shvuos 2:15-16. The Radvaz there explains that the Rambam understands that Rav Ashi’s suggestion that the breisa is only concerned about deceptions like that of the cane in Rava’s court was only offered “bederech dechiyah.” But as noted in the text, this is difficult to understand in light of the fact that Rav Ashi was engaged in defending the Mishnah from Ravina’s objection, and the Gemara offers no other defense of the Mishnah.
Related Posts
