Lodging Complaint, Part II: Can a Surprised Hotelier Cancel a Deal?

Adapted from the writings of Dayan Yitzhak Grossman

January 1, 2026

Our previous article, on the dispute between the Meron guesthouse owners and Satmar, cited rulings of the Sefer Yehoshua, the Maharsham, the Tshuras Shai, and the Chesed LeAvraham in similar cases. All maintain that if before a sale there was a change in circumstances that, had it been known, would have affected the market price, but it was not known at the time of the sale to one of the parties, is grounds for reversing the sale as mekach ta’us, ona’ah, or both. This is so even though the change had not affected the prevailing market price, because it was not yet generally known.

The “Butchatcher” (R’ Avraham Dovid Wahrman), however, is inclined to disagree, in the context of yet another similar case:

I have heard that some are unsure about the case where merchandise arrived from nearby immediately after a sale took place (and at the time of the sale it was already on the way), so the price dropped—whether ona’ah is applicable.

Some prove that it does constitute ona’ah from the case of the drought in Neharde’a (cited in the previous article)…But in my humble opinion, this is not at all analogous to that…

The Butchatcher proceeds to explain that Rav Nachman’s psak in the Neharde’a drought case was not rooted in the classic doctrine of mekach ta’us, but in the fact that the sellers there had made a gilui da’as (i.e., they clearly indicated) that they were motivated to sell by the need for money to buy food, so when that motivation turned out to have been based on a misconception, the sales were void. Therefore, because the halacha follows the view that gilui da’as is only relevant to sales of karkaos, not metaltelin (real, not personal, property),[1] Rav Nachman’s ruling is irrelevant to our case. The Butchatcher explains that ona’ah is also inapplicable, because ona’ah depends on the prevailing market price at the time and place of the sale,[2] and that sale was at the then-prevailing price.[3]

The Imrei Yosher (R’ Meir Arik) penned one of the most substantial discussions of our topic of which this author is aware. He was asked by R’ Yechezkel Shraga Halberstam of Cheshanov about a case very similar to that of the Sefer Yehoshua: Reuven purchased thirty liters of liquor from Shimon, paying in full but taking possession of only twenty liters. Prior to the sale, but unbeknownst to Shimon, a new tax rate had been imposed on liquor—almost double the old rate—to take effect the day after the sale. All sellers who knew about the increase (apparently payable by the producer or seller) raised their prices, so Shimon’s sale price was only still available from sellers who hadn’t heard.

The Imrei Yosher initially explains that whether this is ona’ah hinges on whether most of the sellers in the area were aware of the new law. If they were, the sale is ona’ah, even though the law did not take effect until the following day, because the sellers would already not sell at the old price. But if the sellers were unaware, it isn’t ona’ah, because ona’ah depends entirely on the time and place.[4]

The Imrei Yosher then addresses his correspondent’s suggestion that the sale was a mekach ta’us because had the seller known about the new regulation, he would only have sold for much more. The Imrei Yosher concedes that this is a plausible argument, even though the sale happened before the regulation was known locally. He notes his correspondent’s citation of Neharde’a as a precedent, but he counters that Rav Nachman’s ruling may have been rooted in the sellers’ gilui da’as in that case. He cites the Butchatcher to that effect but points out that the Maharit (R’ Yosef MiTrani) understands that Neharde’a was a mekach ta’us even without gilui da’as. He ultimately concludes that given the view of the Maharit,

At least with regard to the liquor that the seller has not yet delivered, it appears that he is not obligated to deliver it, because it is a mekach ta’us or ona’ah[5]…and perhaps he may keep all the money that is in his possession for the ten liters (sic; presumably, twenty liters), because he can say “kim li (I hold)” that it is a mekach ta’us like the Maharit or that it is ona’ah…

The Imrei Yosher concludes with a fundamental point:

In any event, it appears that in our case, the fact that Reuven, the buyer, knew at the time of the sale about the new law makes no difference whatsoever. Because if the sale involves ona’ah and mekach ta’us, this is so even if neither of them knew of the new law, and if it does not involve ona’ah and mekach ta’us, then even if Reuven knew and intended to mislead Shimon, the sale is valid—for we never find distinctions in this context between where he intended to deceive and where he did not…[6]

We can now consider the decision of the Bais Din Tzedek of Bnei Brak, which decided unequivocally in favor of Satmar, rejecting the guesthouse owners’ claims of both ona’ah and mekach ta’us:

Ona’ah is measured in relation to the market price that prevails at the time of the closing of the deal, where the price is established via the collective of landlords—on the basis of the facts and the conditions of supply and demand that are known and publicized at that time. When the deal is closed at a price that does not correspond to this, the laws of ona’ah apply according to the principles in the Shulchan Aruch (with the particular dinim specific to hospitality rentals). In our case, because at the time of the closing of the deal the expanded demand for that particular Shabbos was unknown, the price of a rental for that Shabbos remained at the usual rate, so the closing of a deal at that price does not result in any room whatsoever for a claim of ona’ah. This applies even if there was already a plan in place for the arrival of multitudes for that Shabbos, the publicization of which would certainly cause a rise in prices. Since the plan hadn’t been publicized, its mere existence—even if it was decisively finalized—cannot change the price, which, as noted, is set based on the facts that were publicized and known to the community of landlords. (See Shu”t Imrei Yosher cheilek 2 siman 155.)

Despite this, it is still possible that there would be room to consider the claim of the plaintiff to cancel the deal under mekach ta’us, in light of his claim that had he been aware of the plan, he would certainly not have agreed to close the deal at that price. The truth is, however, that because it was determined that the deal that was closed was very profitable, in that a relatively high price was paid for each bed—even for the youth beds and sofas whose prices are usually much lower—and also three nights were reserved and paid for, we cannot establish with certainty that the plaintiff would not have agreed to close the deal had he been aware of the plan, because at that time he was not assured that he would succeed in obtaining a more profitable deal. Accordingly, it is impossible to void the deal on the grounds of mekach ta’us, a claim that stands only in a situation where it is certain that the deal would not have closed absent the error. (See Kiryas Melech Rav, Mechirah 12:13.)[7]

The bais din’s rejection of the claim of mekach ta’us is based on its assessment of the realia, and we can certainly defer to it on this. But its rejection of the claim of ona’ah on halacha grounds, based on the teshuvah of the Imrei Yosher, is quite puzzling. Although the Imrei Yosher and the Butchatcher do indeed reject applying ona’ah to cases like this, we have seen that the Maharsham, the Tshuras Shai, and the Chesed LeAvraham all apparently assume it does apply. It is difficult to understand why a bais din would rule like the Imrei Yosher and ignore these other eminent authorities without explanation, particularly since the guesthouse owner was in possession (muchzak) of both his property and the rent, which was paid in advance.

Perhaps the bais din assumes that even these Acharonim would agree that ona’ah is inapplicable here, either because unlike governmental actions, the plans of private citizens are not substantial enough facts to turn a sale at the prevailing price into ona’ah, or because unlike in their cases, where the new information was publicly available and had already changed prices in some locations, Satmar’s plans were not publicized and hadn’t changed any prices. It is unclear, however, how cogent these distinctions are, and the bais din does not articulate them.

[1]Shulchan Aruch C.M. 207:3.

[2]See Rabeinu Yerucham, Sefer Meisharim, nesiv 9 cheilek 3 p. 31b column 1, and cf. Toldos Adam VeChavah, nesiv 19 cheilek 1 p. 167a column 1 and Piskei HaRosh Kidushin perek 1 siman 17.

[3]Kessef Hakodshim 227:9.

[4]The Imrei Yosher proceeds to explain that if the new law was widely known, there are a number of other considerations with regard to the applicability of ona’ah. (These considerations are beyond the scope of this article.) The Imrei Yosher does not appear to reach a definitive conclusion about ona’ah in this case, but as noted in the article text, he does, at the conclusion of his teshuvah, invoke ona’ah (along with mekach ta’us) as a basis for his decision that the seller is not obligated to deliver the portion of the goods that he has not delivered, and perhaps he may even keep the money in his possession in exchange for the goods that he has delivered. This invocation of ona’ah is presumably due to his assumption that in the case before him, the new law was indeed widely known, in which case the Imrei Yosher had explained earlier that it is at least possible that ona’ah applies, as opposed to a situation where the new law was not widely known, in which case the Imrei Yosher did not entertain any possibility that ona’ah would apply.

[5]See the previous note.

[6]Shu”t Imrei Yosher cheilek 2 siman 155.

[7]Beis Din Tzedek Bnei Brak, 14 Kislev, 5786, 17024, paragraph 3.