Don’t Blame Me, It Was GPT: Are People Liable When AI Errs?

Adapted from the writings of Dayan Yitzhak Grossman

November 13, 2025

From a recent ruling by U.S. Magistrate Judge Jason Robertson in Mattox v. Product Innovations Research, LLC, a case in which attorneys submitted pleadings written by ChatGPT, filled with wild AI “hallucinations”:

This ruling is not about technology. It is about trust. Justice is built on language, and language draws its power from the hearts and minds that create it. Words alone are empty until filled with human conviction. The same is true of every pleading filed before this Court. Generative technology can produce words, but it cannot give them belief. It cannot attach courage, sincerity, truth, or responsibility to what it writes. That remains the sacred duty of the lawyer who signs the page.

Across eleven pleadings, that duty was forgotten. As outlined below, Plaintiffs’ counsel submitted pleadings containing fabricated case citations, erroneous citations, quotations of nonexistent law, and misstatements of law. The filings ranged from summary-judgment briefing, to motions in limine, and even a sanctions motion. The pattern was not inadvertent, and it was not harmless. The Court values trust among advocates, but trust must be earned through verification. In this case, filings were trusted, but never verified, and the results speak for themselves.

After reviewing the record, conducting two show-cause hearings, and considering the affidavits, testimony, and argument of counsel, the Court finds that the use of generative artificial intelligence in the preparation of these pleadings violated both Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court’s AI Guidelines on Generative AI Disclosure and Certification.

The integrity of judicial proceedings depends on the authenticity of what is filed. This case demonstrates the cost of neglecting that obligation…

Generative tools may assist, but they can never replace the moral nerve that transforms thought into advocacy. Before this Court, artificial intelligence is optional. Actual intelligence is mandatory.

The court ordered the lawyers to pay $23,000 in legal fees and an additional $6000 in sanctions.[1]

In this article, we explore the halachic framework governing when a litigant is obligated to compensate his opponent for costs, particularly where those costs were a consequence of his misconduct.

The Rishonim rule that a losing litigant is generally not required to compensate the victor for his costs, even where they resulted from the loser having insisted that the case be adjudicated at the bais din hagadol, a distant venue.[2] The Rishonim note two major exceptions to this rule:

• A defendant who refused to cooperate with bais din, requiring the plaintiff to spend money to compel his cooperation, is liable for all expenses that this caused.[3] While there is an opinion that an uncooperative defendant must pay the plaintiff’s expenses regardless of whether he won or lost the case,[4] most poskim say it applies only if he lost.[5] They debate whether the plaintiff may collect those expenses if he lost but his claim was made in good faith.[6] The Erech Shai is uncertain whether the defendant must also reimburse the plaintiff for his personal effort (tircha) to compel the defendant’s cooperation.[7]
• A litigant who commits to appear before bais din at a certain time (“leich va’ani avo acharecha”) and fails to do so must repay what his opponent spent relying on his commitment.[8]

The Yeshuos Yisrael (R’ Yisrael Yehoshua Trunk of Kutna) adds another exception (which he bases, at least in part, on the above rule about the litigant who said “leich va’ani avo acharecha”): It applies only where the loser did not act in bad faith, e.g., he lost because he couldn’t meet the burden of proof, but there was no conclusive evidence that he lied; or he mistakenly thought his position was supported by the halacha. But if his claim was mendacious—e.g., it was contradicted by witnesses—the liar is indeed liable for his opponent’s costs.

The Yeshuos Yisrael distinguishes, however, between a plaintiff who brought a case in bad faith and forced the defendant to incur costs in defending it—who he says certainly must pay—and a defendant who insisted in bad faith on having his case adjudicated at the bais din hagadol, whose liability he holds is subject to a machlokess Rishonim.[9]

R’ Tzvi Yehudah Ben-Yaakov, a dayan on the Bais Din Harabani Hagadol in Eretz Yisrael, extends the Yeshuos Yisrael’s idea to a litigant who requested an additional bais din session so he could bring more proofs and witnesses, but then arrived with nothing new. Rav Ben-Yaakov held him liable for the costs of the pointless session.[10]

R’ Moshe Feinstein (in a teshuvah addressed to R’ Aryeh Leib Grossnass of the London Beth Din) discusses another scenario in which the loser must pay the winner’s expenses: where the litigants signed an agreement that the losing party will bear all costs. R’ Moshe focuses on the problem of asmachta (a conditional obligation, which is generally not binding), but the details of his analysis are beyond the scope of this article.[11]

In Judge Robertson’s case, he held the lawyers liable for trusting and not verifying the AI output. Based on our discussion, a plaintiff who deliberately submitted such pleadings, causing the defendant to incur expenses, would be liable, and presumably a lawyer who did so would be equally liable. But it is less clear if, as in this case, this was done not deliberately but by recklessly and negligently relying on AI without verification.

The Yeshuos Yisrael grounds his argument in various precedents in which Reuven suffered a loss by relying on a false representation by Shimon, and the halacha holds Shimon liable if he was lying. But if Shimon believed what he said was true but was negligent in not verifying it, the halacha is less clear; we have previously discussed this point in a couple of articles on the topic of products liability:

The Maharsham discusses the case of a woman who purchased a chemical leavening agent from a peddler to bake honey cakes for a wedding. The cakes failed, apparently because the peddler inadvertently supplied the wrong ingredient. In the course of his analysis of the question of liability, the Maharsham discusses whether dina degarmi (a category of indirect damage for which the perpetrator is nonetheless liable) applies even to inadvertent damage (shogeig), but he argues that in his case, the seller has a duty of care that results in his conduct being characterized as virtually deliberate (karov lemeizid).[12]

R’ Tzvi Shpitz, a contemporary dayan, discusses a similar case—initially considered by R’ Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (whose analysis is not directly applicable to our case)—of a shopkeeper who inadvertently provided sugar to a customer that asked for salt. The buyer cooked with it and ruined his food. Like the Maharsham, Rav Shpitz argues that the shopkeeper would be liable under the rule of dina degarmi, because he is considered negligent (posheia) rather than shogeig.[13],[14]

The reckless reliance on AI systems known to be prone to hallucination would likely be considered karov lemeizid and posheia as well, and would thus engender liability in our case according to the Maharsham and Rav Shpitz. It should be noted, however, that the rules governing dina degarmi in general, and the type of garmi we are dealing with here in particular, are quite complex and often the subject of debate. A careful analysis of the sources cited in our previous articles and the discussion of the Yeshuos Yisrael is called for before reaching a definitive conclusion in our case.[15]

[1]https://websitedc.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/Mattox_v._Product_Innovations_Research_USA_22_October_2025.pdf

[2]Piskei HaRosh Sanhedrin perek 3 siman 40 and Shu”t HaRosh klal 73 simanim 1-2 and the end of klal 107; Tur C.M. end of siman 14; Shulchan Aruch C.M. 14:5. Cf. Shu”t Igros Moshe C.M. cheilek 2 siman 26 anaf 1.

[3]Rosh ibid. (in his psakim and shu”t klal 107, he attributes the distinction between a cooperative litigant and an uncooperative one to Maharam MeiRutenburg). See Bais Yosef ibid. for further sources for and discussion of this halacha.

[4]Shu”t Veshav Hakohein siman 99.

[5]Shu”t Rivash end of siman 475, cited by Sma ibid. s.k. 28. All the sources cited in the following note agree with the Rivash and Sma.

[6]The Urim Vetumim (ibid. Tumim s.k. 4, Urim s.k. 23) inclines—though he is not certain—to the view that an uncooperative defendant who won is still liable for the plaintiff’s costs as long as the plaintiff’s claims were made in good faith and were not based on deception. The Nesivos Hamishpat (ibid. Biurim s.k. 4) quotes the Tumim as endorsing this position without acknowledging the Tumim’s uncertainty, and the Aruch Hashulchan ibid. se’if 10 rules this way as well. The Yeshuos Yisrael (ibid. end of Chukas Hamishpat os 6) cites the Tumim as inclining toward holding the defendant liable, but he says “ve’ein dvarav muchrachin.” Cf. Pis’chei Teshuvah ibid. s.k. 12.

R’ Shlomo Weissman (Recovering the Costs of Litigation in Beit Din, The Journal of the Beth Din of America 1 (2012) p. 71) implies that the Rivash and Sma exempt an uncooperative defendant who won from liability for the plaintiff’s expenses even if the plaintiff acted in good faith, but it seems to this writer that the Tumim, Nesivos, and Aruch Hashulchan do not mean to disagree with the Rivash and Sma but to qualify their position.

[7]Erech Shai ibid. at the end of the siman.

[8]Mordechai ibid. siman 707 (citing Maharam MeiRutenburg), cited in Bais Yosef ibid. (at the end of the siman) and codified by the Rama ibid. Cf. Yeshuos Yisrael ibid. Ein Mishpat os 5; Shu”t Avnei Cheifetz siman 74 os 7.

[9]Yeshuos Yisrael ibid. Ein Mishpat os 4 and Chukas Hamishpat os 5.

In a ruling published in Piskei Din Shel Batei Hadin Harabani’im BeYisrael Volume 3 (pp. 19 and 21), the court understood the Yeshuos Yisrael to maintain that even a bad-faith defendant is liable for the plaintiff’s costs according to all opinions. But this is a misreading of the Yeshuos Yisrael, as noted in a ruling by another court published in Piskei Din Volume 6 (pp. 81 and 83).

[10]Mishpatecha LeYaakov cheilek 3 siman 43 os 3: Hotza’as Mishpat.

For further discussion of the principle that a plaintiff who litigates in bad faith is liable for costs he caused the defendant, see Bais Hadin Haeizori Ashkelon, tik mispar 63609-6.

[11]Igros Moshe ibid. anaf 2. Cf. Rav Weissman pp. 72-74.

[12]Shu”t Maharsham cheilek 5 siman 11.

[13]Mishpetei HaTorah Bava Kama pp. 37-41.

[14]Erring on the Side: Is Pfizer Liable for Harmful Side Effects of its Products? Dec. 22, 2022, and see also Bad Goods: Products Liability in Halacha. May 15, 2025.

[15]For further discussion of the general topic of the liability of a litigant for the costs of his opponent, see: Piskei Din Volume 3 pp. 18-39 and Volume 6 pp. 81-89; Bais Din Haeizori Cheifah, mispar siduri 13175; Bais Din Haeizori Petach Tikvah, tik mispar 1178793/2; Bais Din Haeizori Ashkelon ibid.; R’ Yoezer Ariel, Dinei Borerus, Sha’ar Shmini: Hotzaos Hadiyun, pp. 393-435; Eretz Chemdah-Gazit, Sikum Kenness Hadayanim-5774; Rav Weissman ibid. pp. 66-75; R’ Itamar Rosensweig, Recovering the Costs of Litigation in Beit Din; R’ Daniel Katz, Hischeivus Leshaleim Al Hotzaos Mishpat, Emunas Itecha Nisan 5773 pp. 111-17 and Chiyuv Behotzaos Mishpat (also here); Chiyuv Hotza’os Mishpat, Olamot.