Death’s Door, Part II: Risking Life Wrongly but with Pious Motives

Adapted from the writings of Dayan Yitzhak Grossman

June 19, 2025

In our previous article we cited the position of R’ Yosef Shalom Elyashiv:

Ab initio (lechat’chilah), it is clear that it is prohibited to endanger oneself to save a sefer Torah, for this is not among the things of which it is said, “He should be killed and not violate the prohibition.” But bedieved, if he endangered himself and saved the sefer Torah, great reward will be his, because he intended to honor the Torah.

The Chozeh (Seer) of Lublin (R’ Yaakov Yitzchok Horowitz) writes:

…Because Chasidus is love, and it is with the entire soul, even if He takes the soul itself, as above, and one is not concerned exclusively with Krias Shma and tfilah. I.e., if it happens that he delays the time because of love of the Creator, blessed is He, because he is engaged in cleaving to Him (dveikus) or praises, or if it seems to him that he will generate before Him, blessed be He, more satisfaction (nachas ruach) if he does not recite Krias Shma and tfilah, then although the evil inclination remonstrates with him, he is not concerned for any punishment due to his love of the Creator, in order to carry out His will to a greater degree. And the truth is that the Merciful One desires the heart (Rachmana liba ba’i), and greater is a transgression committed for its own sake (gedolah aveirah lishmah), and this is what is meant by “Let all your deeds be for the sake of Heaven.”[1],[2]

This is the Gemara invoked by the Chozeh in support of his radical statement:

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak said: A transgression committed for the sake of Heaven is…equal to a mitzvah performed for ulterior motives…For it is written (regarding Yael, who transgressed for the sake of Heaven): She will be blessed with the women, will Yael, wife of Chever the Keini, she will be blessed with the women in the tent. Who are “the women in the tent”? Sarah, Rivkah, Rachel, and Leah.[3]

R’ Chaim Volozhiner, one of the leading architects of the philosophical opposition to Chasidus, vehemently insists in numerous places in his magnum opus Nefesh Hachaim that subsequent to Matan Torah, the Torah’s precepts may never be set aside, no matter the purity of one’s intentions. He categorically rejects the idea that this can be justified under the doctrines of aveirah lishmah or Rachmana liba ba’i.[4] He explains that all the instances found in divrei Chazal of tzadikim violating the Torah for the sake of some greater goal occurred before Matan Torah, though he surprisingly does not address the Gemara’s own paradigmatic example of Yael, which happened after Matan Torah. But his talmid R’ Asher Hakohein records in his work Kesser Rosh that his rebbi offered two explanations of Yael’s act:

It is found in the writings of the Arizal that she was a gilgul (reincarnated soul).
Her intention was to save Klal Yisrael, and chalilah to compare this to other matters in accordance with our reasoning…[5]

This writer believes he recalls a talk in which his rosh yeshivah, R’ Meir Stern, read this passage and commented: “Men darf dos farshteyen; a gilgul is oich mechuyav in mitzvos (We must understand this; a gilgul is also obligated in mitzvos.)”

The Kesser Rosh’s second approach would seem to greatly dilute R’ Chaim Volozhiner’s uncompromising opposition to applying aveirah lishmah to contemporary practice: Once it is accepted that it applies in principle even after Matan Torah, at least when the fate of Klal Yisrael is at stake, then the question becomes merely one of degree—whether a given situation is comparable to that of Yael—rather than one of principle.

Much has been written about aveirah lishmah, but while the general consensus seems to be that the concept is largely theoretical and has limited practical applicability,[6] R’ Asher Weiss notes a number of instances in which eminent poskim have invoked it to justify apparently clear violations of halacha motivated by pure intentions.[7] The most sensational of these appear in teshuvos of the Bais Yaakov and the Shvus Yaakov that justify adultery that was committed in order to save others from death: The Shvus Yaakov discusses the case of a group of travelers accosted by bandits who planned to murder them, and a married woman submitted herself to the bandits in order to save the group from death.[8]

[1]Avos 2:12.

[2]Zikaron Zos (5629), Pinchas, p. 124a.

[3]Nazir 23b and Horayos 10b.

[4]Nefesh Hachaim sha’ar 1 perek 22; sha’ar 3 perek 7; prakim following sha’ar 3, perek 4 and perek 7.

[5]Orchos Chaim/Kesser Rosh os 132. For other variations of R’ Chaim’s understanding of the incident of Yael, see Nefesh Hachaim (Bnei Brak 5749) p. 203 in the note.

R’ Chaim Volozhiner’s grandson-in-law and eventual successor as rosh hayeshivah of Volozhin, the Netziv, discusses the parameters of aveirah lishmah in numerous places in his writings. While he seems to be more open than R’ Chaim to the concept’s applicability even after Matan Torah, at least in theory, it is unclear whether he would really accept its invocation in practice. See Shu”t Meishiv Davar cheilek 2 siman 9 p. 75; Harchev Davar Bereishis 27:9 and Shmos 32:27; Ha’ameik Davar Bemidbar at the end of 16:1 and Dvarim 4:3.

[6]See, e.g., R’ Tzvi Heber, Aveirah Lesheim Shamayim, Ma’aliyot, 21 Av, 5759.

[7]R’ Asher Weiss, Parshas Vayeira: Gedolah Aveirah Lishmah, and cf. Shu”t Minchas Asher cheilek 2 siman 134 p. 449 s.v. Veharbei hisbonanti.

[8]Shu”t Bais Yaakov siman 39; Shu”t Shvus Yaakov cheilek 2 siman 117, and cf. Shu”t Ateress Chachamim E.H. simanim 29-30. See, however, Shu”t Noda Bihudah tinyana Y.D. siman 161 s.v. Umikol makom guf hadin for a dissenting view.