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Court Favor: May a Dayan Employ Compassion?
Adapted from the writings of Dayan Yitzhak Grossman
February 12, 2026
The Associated Press reports:
Frank Caprio, a retired municipal judge in Rhode Island who found online fame as a caring jurist and host of “Caught in Providence,” has died. He was 88…
Caprio billed his courtroom as a place “where people and cases are met with kindness and compassion.” He was known for dismissing tickets or showing kindness even when he handed out justice…
Caprio’s show was filmed in his courtroom and featured his folksy humor and compassion. Clips from the show have had more than 1 billion views on social media…
Caprio’s upbeat take on the job of a judge drew him millions of views. His most popular videos have been those where he calls children to the bench to help pass judgment on their parents. One shows him listening sympathetically to a woman whose son was killed and then dismissing her tickets and fines of $400.[1]
In this article, we consider whether the Torah allows compassion and sympathy to be factors in judicial decision-making.
Vedal lo sehdar berivo
At first blush, it would seem absolutely forbidden for a judge to take sympathy into account, because the Torah commands “Vedal lo sehdar berivo (You shall not glorify a destitute person in his dispute)”[2] and “lo sisa fnei dal (you shall not favor a destitute person).”[3] But deeper investigation reveals that the halacha is actually more nuanced.
The way of the good and the paths of the righteous
There is a famous account in the Gemara of porters who negligently broke an Amora’s barrel of wine. The owner sued, and Rav ruled in favor of the porters, per the exhortation in Mishlei (2:20), “in order that you may walk in the way of the good.” The porters countersued for their wages, pleading that they were poor and hungry and had nothing. Rav once again ruled in their favor, per the conclusion of the pasuk, “and keep the paths of the righteous.”[4]
Rav Sa’adiah Gaon explains that the exhortations in Mishlei are directed only toward litigants, but a dayan is barred by lo sisa fnei dal from deviating from absolute justice.[5] This approach, however, is difficult to reconcile with the text of the Gemara, where Rav, the dayan, demands compliance with those psukim.
The Galya Masechta (R’ Dovid of Novardok) takes a different approach. He infers from this Gemara that sometimes a dayan should not strictly enforce the letter of the law, and he suggests that perhaps vedal lo sehdar berivo is limited to a defendant who received money from the plaintiff and is refusing to repay it rather than one who became liable via negligence.[6]
Some go even further and argue, based on this Gemara, that compassion is indeed a legitimate factor, and vedal lo sehdar berivo applies only when the judge completely ignores the din and decides based entirely on compassion. But where there are legitimate arguments on both sides, the judge is sometimes permitted to include considerations of compassion and pity toward suffering laborers.[7]
Enforcing lifnim mishuras hadin
More generally, there is a major dispute among the Rishonim and Acharonim whether a bais din may ever compel a litigant to go lifnim mishuras hadin (beyond the letter of the law).[8] Some poskim rule that it may, depending on the relative economic situations of the litigants, while others disagree. Some adopt compromise positions, e.g., that bais din may not use physical force to compel a litigant to act lifnim mishuras hadin, but it may apply pressure with cheirem (excommunication), and perhaps it may even seize his property to enforce compliance.[9] Others disagree and maintain that according to the restrictive view of the Rishonim, even cheirem may not be used. Even these views allow the use of moral suasion,[10] including, at least according to some, telling the litigant that he will be a sinner if he does not act lifnim mishuras hadin.[11]
Based on this discussion, R’ Zalman Nechemiah Goldberg explains that the essential difference between din and lifnim mishuras hadin is not the degree of obligation, because some maintain that even the latter is obligatory and enforceable. Rather, the specific obligations of the Torah are universally and absolutely binding, whereas the general obligation of lifnim mishuras hadin is situational and depends on the economic situations of the litigants and other contextual details.[12]
Bais Hillel and R’ Yitzchak Elchanan
R’ Shlomo Yosef Zevin, following a disclaimer that he is unsure whether compassion can play a role in composing psak in a teshuvah, notes that R’ Yitzchak Elchanan Spektor’s teshuvos usually arrive at lenient conclusions. He cites the mekubalim as saying that the neshamos of Bais Shamai were rooted in supernal din, while those of Bais Hillel were rooted in supernal compassion, and he maintains that “it seems that the root of the Torah soul of R’ Yitzchak Elchanan was quarried from the midah of chesed.”[13]
[1]Steve Leblanc. Rhode Island Judge Frank Caprio, whose empathy in court earned him fame online, dies at 88. Associated Press.
[2]Shmos 23:4.
[3]Vayikra 19:15.
[4]Bava Metzia 83a.
[5]Cited in Halacha Psukah cheilek 2 siman 12 n. 135 and Michoel Vigoda, Vedal Lo Sehdar Berivo.
[6]Shu”t Galya Masechta end of C.M. siman 13 s.v. Ibra dechol zeh.
[7]R’ Avraham Yitzchak Kook, cited by Vigoda ibid.
[8]Mordechai Bava Metzia remez 258; Agudah ibid. os 34; Ra’avan, beginning of Eilu Metzios; Piskei HaRosh ibid. perek 2 siman 7; Bais Yosef and Bach C.M. siman 12; Rama ibid. se’if 2; Shu”t Shav Yaakov E.H. end of siman 29 s.v. Umah sheratzah harav hana”l; Shu”t Knessess Yechezkel O.C. end of siman 7 end of s.v. Amnam. Cf. the sources cited in the following notes, and see in particular Shu”t Heishiv Moshe (Y.D.) end of siman 48.
[9]Shu”t Tzemach Tzedek siman 89 s.v. Aval mikol makom nir’ah.
[10]Shu”t Shvus Ya’akov cheilek 1 siman 168; Aruch Hashulchan ibid. end of se’if 2.
[11]Tumim ibid. s.k. 4.; Chochmas Shlomo C.M. ibid.
[12]Kedoshim Tihyu (5755); Vehagisa Bo Yomam Valeilah (5757).
[13]Sfarim Vesofrim, Teshuvos, Agunos Bis’shuvos R’ Yitzchak Elchanan. As an example of his thesis, Rav Zevin notes that in the first volume of R’ Yitzchak Elchanan’s Ein Yitzchak there are more than seventy teshuvos dealing with all sorts of agunos, and in all but one he rules leniently.
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