Adapted from the writings of Dayan Yitzhak Grossman April 17, 2026 Our previous article cited…
Cooked Books, Part II: May an Employee Be Fired for Unproven Malfeasance?
Adapted from the writings of Dayan Yitzhak Grossman
September 18, 2025
Our previous article broached the question of whether public officials can be fired for alleged or rumored, but unproven, impropriety. We cited several Gemaros and discussions of later authorities on the halachic implications of various sorts of rumors; this article continues that analysis.
The Gemara says:
Rav Nachman said: One who is suspected (chashud) of illicit sexual relations is kasher le’eidus (a valid witness). Rav Sheishess said: Answer me this, my master: Forty lashes upon his shoulder, and you say he is kasher le’eidus?
Rava said: Rav Nachman concedes that he is disqualified for testimony regarding the marital status of a woman.[1]
The Rishonim have two major disagreements regarding the meaning and implications of this brief passage:
- Does chashud here refer to someone whose guilt has been conclusively established or to someone who is merely suspected?
- Does the halacha follow the view of Rav Nachman that the chashud in question is kasher le’eidus, or the apparent view of Rav Sheishess that he is not?
The Rosh cites Rabeinu Tam that chashud refers to one whose guilt has been conclusively established, but he himself disagrees and explains that chashud means that
He is frequently involved with and familiar with arayos (women forbidden to him), and he secludes himself with them, and snei shum’anei (his reputation is sullied). He receives forty lashes on his shoulders because we flog for seclusion with any arayos except a married woman,[2] and we flog for lo tovah hashmuah (the report is not good), kala delo pasik (a rumor that did not stop), when the multitudes are spreading a rumor about him.[3]
The Rif cites, apparently approvingly, some authorities that rule like Rav Sheishess that a chashud is pasul le’eidus (an invalid witness),[4] but the Rosh and the Tur rule like Rav Nachman that he is not,[5] and the Bais Yosef notes that this is the position of a number of other Rishonim as well.[6] The Mordechai, however, understands that the chashud discussed here is merely suspected of impropriety but his guilt has not been conclusively established, and he cites and agrees with Rav Hai Gaon that the halacha follows Rav Sheishess, so even a suspected person is pasul le’eidus.
The Rashba in a teshuvah appears to adopt a position similar to that of the Mordechai (though he curiously makes no mention of the above Gemara and the Rishonim’s discussion of it), ruling that although someone who is the subject of a rumor is not disqualified from testifying and swearing, we nevertheless do not grant him the privilege of swearing, and we certainly do not order anyone to pay money based upon his oath or testimony:
If there is a rumor about him, a kala delo pasik, we are concerned for it, and we do not swear him, and we do not extract money based upon his shvuah, for we only extract money with clear testimony. Although he had a chezkas kashrus (a presumption of uprightness and qualification for eidus and shvuah), and we do not disqualify him based on rumor, we are nevertheless concerned for it…[7]
The Rama rules:
One is not pasul le’eidus based on mere rumor and suspicion, e.g., one who is suspected of arayos…is kasher for all eidus except about the status of a married woman.[8]
The Acharonim explain (based on the language of the Rosh cited above) that even someone with a kala delo pasik remains qualified for eidus and shvuah (pace the Rashba and the Mordechai).[9] The Bach, however, disagrees with the Rama and rules like the Mordechai that lechat’chilah (ab initio) we do not extract money from a litigant on the eidus of a suspected person.[10]
The Kol Bo rules:
A shliach tzibur (chazan) about whom the people are meranein (scandalmongering) that he was caught with a non-Jewish woman: If this matter is established via two valid eidim that he was caught with her in such a manner that he would be liable for lashes, and he has not yet been lashed and has not submitted and has not done teshuvah [or if the shliach tzibur was established to have committed various other sins]…he is disqualified thereby and it is appropriate to remove him. But for rinun without witnesses, he is not disqualified.[11]
The Rama codifies the Kol Bo’s ruling.[12] The Olas Tamid explains that this just means we do not remove someone who already holds the position based upon an unsubstantiated rumor, but we do not initially appoint such a person.[13]
The simple reading of the Kol Bo and Rama would seem to be that no rumor unsubstantiated by witnesses, even a kala delo pasik, is sufficient grounds for removing an already-appointed shliach tzibur, just as the Acharonim understand that even a kala delo pasik does not disqualify its subject from eidus and shvuah. But the Magein Avraham cites a ruling of the Ra’anach (R’ Eliyahu Ben Chaim) that even a single member of the tzibur may demand the removal of a shat”z with a kala delo pasik.[14] The Pri Megadim accordingly understands that the Rama is referring only to an “ordinary” rumor, but a kala delo pasik is indeed grounds for removal.[15] The Chasam Sofer, however, explains that the Rama means that as long as the tzibur unanimously supports the shat”z, we do not remove him over a rumor—even a kala delo pasik—but even a single community member can insist on his removal.[16]
The Biur Halacha raises a fundamental problem with removing a chazan from his post based on any kind of rumor: In addition to the loss of his position, he would also suffer the loss of his salary, and it is “obvious and clear” that no rumor is sufficient to impose a financial loss.[17]
To resolve this problem, the Biur Halacha notes that the Gemara implies that the reason we disregard a salacious rumor is not because we believe it may be completely unfounded; we acknowledge that it likely has an element of truth, but it may be exaggerated:
Rava said: If an unmarried woman was rumored in town to have had relations with an idolater or a slave, we do not pay heed to such a rumor (to forbid her to marry a kohein). What is the reason? We assume that those who started the rumor saw only that she engaged in lewd behavior.[18]
Accordingly, when a shliach tzibur is rumored to have committed a serious sexual transgression, though we are not convinced that is true, we are convinced that he at least behaved improperly,
And with respect to a chazan, it is possible that we presume that people would not want to appoint ab initio a man who is so licentious that he will become the subject of a kala delo pasik regarding such relations, and he should have guarded himself not to come to this.
This is similar to the position of the Divrei Malkiel, cited at the end of our article on firing for cause,[19] that an employer may fire someone rumored to be guilty of theft, because it is entirely clear (umdena demuchach) that an employer would never have hired and trusted an employee who is rumored to be suspected of theft.[20]
The Bais Efraim (R’ Efraim Zalman Margalios) was asked about a shochet who was the subject of a rumor. He rules emphatically that
This does not require waiting[21] (i.e., the matter should be resolved immediately and unequivocally); we do not remove this shochet from his chazakah based on rinah. I have already written at length in a teshuvah to clarify that even with a kala delo pasik, we do not remove any man from his chezkas kashrus with respect to psul le’eidus and similar matters…[22]
The Bais Efraim proceeds to argue that in his particular case, there were additional considerations against giving weight to the rumor. But even absent those considerations, he seems to reject out of hand the idea of relying upon a rumor—even one that constitutes a kala delo pasik—to revoke a chezkas kashrus.[23]
[3]Piskei HaRosh Sanhedrin perek 3 siman 13, cited in Bais Yosef C.M. siman 34 s.v. Haba al ervah.
[4]Sanhedrin 5b in Rif pagination.
[5]Rosh ibid. and Tur ibid. s.v. Haba al ha’ervah.
[6]Bais Yosef ibid.
[7]Shu”t HaRashba cheilek 4 siman 166, cited in Bais Yosef ibid. s.v. Kovrei hameis.
[8]Hagahos HaRama ibid. se’if 25.
[9]Sma ibid. s.k. 61; Nesivos Hamishpat ibid. Chidushim s.k. 27; Moznayim Lemishpat ibid.; Mishnah Acharonah ibid.
[10]Bach ibid. s.v. Haba al ha’ervah, cited in Knessess Hagedolah ibid. Hagahos Bais Yosef os 34.
[11]Kol Bo, shu”t at the end of the work (p. 109 column 4), cited in Darchei Moshe O.C. siman 53 (os 10).
[12]Hagahos HaRama ibid. se’if 25.
[13]Olas Tamid ibid. os 15, cited in Magein Avraham ibid. s.k. 7 (the Magein Avraham cites the Olas Tamid’s distinction without attribution), Ba’er Heiteiv ibid. s.k. 31, and Mishnah Brurah ibid. s.k. 75.
[14]Mayim Amukim cheilek 2 siman 42; Magein Avraham ibid. For a detailed discussion of the Ra’anach’s teshuvah, see Aviad Cohen, Anishah Eikev Hisnahagus She’einah Holemess Basheirus Hatziburi, Parshas Shoftim, 5780, Issue #505.
[15]Pri Megadim ibid. Eishel Avraham os 29.
[16]Shu”t Chasam Sofer O.C. siman 11 s.v. Veha’umnam, cited in Biur Halacha ibid. se’if 25. See the Chasam Sofer for a further distinction between different forms of kala delo pasik, and see the Biur Halacha and Be’er Mayim Chaim ibid. os 10 (s.v. Veda od delo nikra kala delo pasik) for discussion of the definition of kala delo pasik.
[17]O.C. siman 53 se’if 25. Cf. Hilchos Lashon Hara klal 7 Be’er Mayim Chaim end of os 10 s.v. Veda.
[19]You May Fire at Will, Jul. 14, 2022.
[20]Shu”t Divrei Malkiel cheilek 3 siman 152.
[22]Shu”t Bais Efraim Y.D. siman 1.
[23]Cf. Shu”t Yehudah Ya’aleh Y.D. siman 6; Darchei Teshuvah siman 2 os 81; Shu”t Zekan Aharon cheilek 2 siman 30.


