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Baby Gap: May a Woman Demand a Divorce Because Her Husband Won’t Give Her Children?

Adapted from the writings of Dayan Yitzhak Grossman

January 29, 2026

Ynet reports:

The Tel Aviv Rabbinical Court ordered a man to divorce his wife and pay her NIS 72,000 ($22,800), the full amount of the ketubah, after ruling that his continued refusal to have additional children justified both divorce and financial liability.

The ruling was handed down despite the husband’s claims that he sought reconciliation, supported marital reconciliation, and had ultimately agreed to have another child. The judges determined that his belated consent did not reflect sincere intent.

The judges ruled that…the husband lacks understanding and emotional awareness of the essence of married life, and fails to grasp that a marital pattern which deliberately prevents a woman from bearing children has no durability and is destined to fail.

“To prevent the husband’s suffering from becoming a father to several children, and to prevent the suffering of a woman who wishes to be a ‘mother of many children,’ the couple must separate,” the ruling stated. “Each should build a family according to his or her worldview and desires. The husband must immediately release the woman to her path, and he shall go his own way.”[1]

We will not undertake a detailed analysis of the bais din’s ruling, but can a wife demand a divorce if her husband doesn’t provide her with children?

The Mishnah says:

A man is commanded to be fruitful and multiply, but not a woman. R’ Yochanan ben Broka says: It is concerning both of them that the Torah says, “And Hashem blessed them and Hashem said to them, “Be fruitful and multiply…”[2]

There is a dispute in the Gemara about which view the halacha follows. It then says:

Come, hear: R’ Acha bar Chanina said in the name of R’ Abahu in the name of R’ Asi: An actual case came before R’ Yochanan in the shul of Keisari (in which a childless woman demanded a get because her husband was infertile), and he said: He must divorce her and pay the ksubah. If you think it possible that a woman is not obligated in piryah verivyah (procreation), of what relevance is the ksubah here? (I.e., why did R’ Yochanan say she is entitled to the ksubah payment if she could have stayed married but chose not to? Apparently, R’ Yochanan holds that a woman is obligated in piryah verivyah and so was required to leave him.)

(The Gemara rejects the proof:) Perhaps in that case she came because of a claim, like the woman who came before R’ Ami and said to him, “Give me the ksubah.” (She was demanding a get and her ksubah payment because her husband was infertile.) He said to her, “Go (leave your husband); you are not obligated (in piryah verivyah, so you are leaving him by choice, so you are not entitled to the ksubah).” She said to him, “But what will become of this woman in her old age?” (If I stay with him and remain childless, who will take care of me?) He said, “With a claim like this, we certainly force (her husband to divorce her and give her the ksubah).” (So perhaps the woman in Keisari made the same claim to R’ Yochanan, in which case there is no proof that he held women are obligated in the mitzvah.)

There was the woman that came before Rav Nachman (and demanded a get because her husband was infertile). He said to her, “You are not obligated (to procreate).” She said to him, “Does this woman not need a cane for her hand and a shovel for her burial?” (I need children to support me in my old age and to bury me.) He said, “With a claim like this, we certainly force.”[3]

The halacha is that a woman is not obligated to have children, so a wife may demand a get and ksubah payment from her infertile husband only if she articulates a need for the assistance of children.[4] Poskim say that if she has even one child—male or female—she cannot make this claim.[5] The Radvaz (R’ Dovid ben Zimra) says she cannot claim it if she has children from another man or—even if she has no surviving children—grandchildren.[6]

It is notable that the Gemara and Rishonim address two arguments of a woman seeking divorce from her infertile husband—mitzvah fulfillment and personal assistance—and not her innate desire to have children. This argument is not discussed by the poskim until relatively recently. In a 5713/1953 psak din, a bais din consisting of R’ Eliezer Goldschmidt (a musmach of R’ Avraham Dov Kahana Shapiro, the Kovno Rav), R’ Shlomo Shimshon Karelitz (a nephew and talmid of the Chazon Ish), and R’ Yosef Babliki (chavrusa of R’ Yosef Shalom Elyashiv) wrote:

Although [the language of the Shulchan Aruch] would seem to imply that this is only when she explicitly claims that the cause of her desire for a child is in order that he will be an aid and support for her, as per the language of the Gemara…the matter is not so, and it is obvious that if a person claims to want a child, there is no difference whether it is for material needs or for spiritual benefit. It is only if her claim explicitly or implicitly indicates that she seeks a child…for the mitzvah of piryah verivyah…this is not a claim that can obligate him to give her a get, because we tell her that she has no such obligation…But if her seeking a child is not for a mitzvah…it is obvious that there is no need to enumerate the understandable reasons that she desires a child…[7]

In a 5716/1956 ruling, a bais din consisting of R’ Yitzchak Isaac Halevi Herzog, R’ Ovadiah Hadaya, and Rav Elyashiv articulated a similar position:

It seems obvious that when a woman comes to demand a divorce due to a claim that she desires a child so that she will have a son that she can lean on, and this is based on Yevamos 65…the intention is not that the woman must claim that she desires a child for this goal…rather, even if her wanting a child is due to the personal pleasure that a mother has from her children and her satisfaction, it is a strong claim to obligate the husband in a get…[8]

R’ Moshe Feinstein writes:

Now it is obvious that every woman desires to give birth to children, and it is a great deficiency (chisaron gadol) to her when it is impossible for her to have children. And aside from the fact that this is known to everyone, it is explicit in the Torah texts regarding the righteous Matriarchs and Chanah, how they sacrificed to give birth to children. And the entire lesson that a person who has no children is considered as dead is derived by R’ Yehoshua ben Levi in Nedarim 64b from Rochel, who said “Give me children—if not, I am dead.”[9] That that we do not compel the husband to divorce her when he cannot father children because she is not commanded in piryah verivyah, unless she says that she needs a child to assist her…and we do not compel him to divorce her when she demands that he divorce her because she wants to give birth to a child…because it is a great blemish (mum) to force a man to divorce his wife—perhaps this is because many women are appeased by their husbands’ goodness to them, as Elkanah told his wife Chanah to appease her that he is better to her than ten children and she should not hurt him greatly by leaving him…[10]

R’ Moshe proceeds to note that while there is a position cited in Tosfos that a woman’s personal desire for children is indeed grounds for demanding a divorce from an infertile husband,[11] a number of Rishonim disagree, and he understands the Shulchan Aruch as siding with the latter view.[12]

[1]Lital Dubrovitsky. Husband’s refusal to have more children leads Israeli court to order divorce and $22,800 payment. Ynet Global. Hebrew version; Calcalist version.

[2]Yevamos 6:6.

[3]Yevamos 65b.

[4]Rambam Hilchos Ishus 15:10.

[5]Nimukei Yosef on the mishnah ibid. (21a in Rif pagination), cited in Bais Shmuel siman 154 s.k. 6; Shu”t HaRadvaz cheilek 3 siman 1004 (575).

[6]Radvaz ibid. (Pis’chei Teshuvah ibid. s.k. 12 cites his ruling regarding grandchildren).

[7]Osef Piskei Din Shel Harabanus Harashis LeEretz Yisrael, Bais Hadin Hagadol Le’ir’urin, Vol. 1, File #3899/5713, pp. 7-8.

[8]Rav Elyashiv goes on to assert that this position was already assumed more than two hundred years ago by R’ Tzvi Hirsch Yanov, in a major teshuvah printed by his father-in-law, R’ Refael Katz, at the end of his work Veshav Hakohein (see p. 403 of the Bnei Brak 5748 edition), but see Rav Karelitz’s critique of this teshuvah in Ateress Shlomo siman 34.

[9]Bereishis 30:1.

[10]Shu”t Igros Moshe E.H. cheilek 4 siman 13 os 1.

[11]Tosfos Yevamos 65a s.v. Shebeino leveinah hi ne’emenness (the second approach).

[12]Ibid. os 2

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